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Implications of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel's Immigration and Asylum 
Decision of August 1993t 
INTRODUCTION 
During its 1993 spring session and additional extraordinary ses-
sion in July, the French Parliament adopted several new laws relating 
to immigration. l These laws were introduced by Charles Pasqua, the 
Interior Secretary for France's right wing political party, Rally for 
the Republic (RPR) , a politician who has stated that his "aim is zero 
immigration."2 Specifically, the legislation encompassed three areas 
of law: one relating to the entry, reception, and stay of foreigners in 
France; another reforming the nationality code regarding marriages 
of convenience; and the third tightening control of identity papers.3 
The controversy surrounding the adoption of stricter immigration 
and asylum laws escalated when the Conseil Constitutionnel (Con-
seil) , the body responsible for judicial review of legislative acts, 
struck down eight of the bill's fifty-one Articles in its Immigration 
and Asylum decision of August 1993, reasoning that those Articles 
deprived foreigners of basic rights guaranteed by the French Con-
stitution.4 By examining the Conseil's Immigration and Asylum deci-
sion regarding the new immigration and asylum legislation, this 
Note attempts to evaluate the Conseil's increasing role as the pro-
tector of individual rights and freedoms. Part I presents an overview 
t The author would like to thank Professors Daniel Kanstroom and Michael Ansaldi for 
their time, ideas, and helpful critique. Translations of the August 13, 1993 Conseil decision, 
as well as French newspaper articles and legal commentary, were completed by the author. 
1 The Political Scene: Immigration questions have been to the Jure, Bus. Int'l Country Rep., Aug. 
1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. For purposes of this Note, Government 
refers to the executive branch, consisting of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Parliament and the legislature refer to the legislative branch. Finally, government without a 
capital "G" refers to the combination of the executive and legislative branches. 
2 Sean Mac Carthaigh, France: Paris Splits Over Immigration, Reuters,june 21, 1993, available 
in Wesdaw, INT-News database. 
3Id. 
4 See generaUy Decision of August 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722 (translation by 
author). **Note that the author has taken the liberty of using short tides for selected Conseil 
decisions throughout this Note for the convenience of the reader. 
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of the Conseil and its role in the French government. Part II ex-
plores past French immigration policy and the reasons underlying 
it. Part II then examines the demographic pressures existing in 
France today, how the new legislation is a response to those pres-
sures, and how the new laws differ from the laws they replace. Part 
III explains the methods of constitutional interpretation employed 
by the Conseil in its decision-making process. Part III then analyzes 
the Conseil's decision to strike down key provisions of the new laws, 
and explores past decisions relating to rights of foreigners. Part IV 
discusses the Government's reaction to the Conseil's decision, in-
cluding the recent constitutional amendment adopted to bring the 
Constitution in conformity with European asylum policy. Part V 
provides an analysis of the growing constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Conseil in relation to the Government, the legislature, and the 
other high courts of France. This Note concludes that the Conseil's 
role as protector of individual freedoms and rights, especially those 
of foreigners, is crucial to constitutional jurisprudence, especially in 
the areas of immigration and asylum law. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 
A. History of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
Review of the constitutionality of legislation is a recent develop-
ment in France, where parliamentary sovereignty and opposition to 
judicial review reigned since the time of the French Revolution.5 The 
political structure of the country centered around the sovereignty 
of the law as it existed in Codes enacted by Parliament.6 The people 
believed their will was represented by the lawmakers,7 and relied 
upon them for the protection of their fundamental rights and free-
5 JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1 (1992); Louis M. Aucoin,judicial Review in 
France: Access of the Individual Under French and European Law in the Aftermath of France's 
Rejection of Bicentennial Reform, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 443, 44~7 (1992). The 
antipathy toward a judicial body stems in part from the administration of law by institutions 
known as parlements. Aucoin, supra, at 446. These institutions consistently opposed legislative 
reform in order to protect the nobility. Id. (quoting RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAw: ITs STRUC-
TURES, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 29 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972». The abolition of 
the parlements was one of the first acts of the French Revolution. Id. at 447. Since that time, 
French authorities have associated a strong judiciary with the concept of a gouvernement des 
juges, or government by judges. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 338-8l. 
6 Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France: The Conseil 
Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TuL. L. REv. 265, 267 (1988). 
7Id. 
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doms as a political obligation.s The concept of judicial review and a 
judicial body empowered to modify the law was unacceptable be-
cause it threatened to undermine the established democratic proc-
ess.9 The rule of law, then, meant the subjection of the Government 
and its citizens to the laws created by Parliament; Parliament alone 
was considered competent to determine the legality of these laws. lO 
Despite France's deeply ingrained tradition of mistrust of quasi-
judicial authority, the creation of the Conseil in 1958 removed Par-
liament as the sole guardian of constitutional values.u France's pre-
sent system of government is based on the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic, adopted in 1958.12 The founders of the Fifth Republic 
based the Constitution on the principle of separation of powers. 13 
The new Constitution increased the power of the executive branch 
and divided legislative authority between the Government and Par-
liament. 14 The 1958 Constitution created the Conseil Constitution-
nel to maintain the balance of power between the Government and 
Parliament,15 and to prevent violations of the Constitution by the 
legislature. 16 
The Conseil is composed of nine members, three appointed by 
the President of the Republic, three by the President of the Senate, 
and three by the President of the National Assembly.17 One member 
is appointed by each of these three officials every three years for a 
nonrenewable term of nine years, and these appointments are nei-
ther subject to any confirmation process, nor can they be set aside. IS 
Past Presidents of the Republic are also members, but for a life 
8 BELL, supra note 5, at 1. 
9 Vroom, supra note 6, at 267. 
10 BELL, supra note 5, at 1. 
II See John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access to Public Benefits 
In France and The United States, 67 TuL. L. REv. 669, 681-82 (1993). It is important to note 
that 'Judicial" is used in a broad sense because, in theory, the Conseil is not a judicial court, 
but rather a special body set up to ensure that Parliament and the executive operate within 
their proper limits. See BELL, supra note 5, at 27. 
12 RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAw: ITS STRUCTURES, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 19 (Michael 
Kindred trans., 1972). The First Republic existed from 1792 to 1804; the Second Republic 
from 1848 to 1852; the Third from 1870 to 1940; and the Fourth from 1944 to 1958. Id. at 
n.l. 
13 Vroom, supra note 6, at 268. 
14Id. at 269. 
15Id. at 273. 
16FR. CONST. tit. 7; DAVID, supra note 12, at 29-30. 
17 BELL, supra note 5, at 34. 
18 ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 8 (1992). 
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term. 19 The process clearly indicates that political affiliation is an 
important criterion for appointment to the Conseil. That impor-
tance seems to dwindle after appointment, however, because of 
insulation from political pressures.20 
The Conseil's members are retired persons, the average age of 
appointment being sixty-five.21 The absence of a further career in 
politics allows the members greater independence and insulation 
from political pressures.22 Consequently, stances taken by members 
of the Conseil have not always conformed with the political views of 
their nominators.23 
Additionally, nominees for appointment are not always of the 
same political party as their nominators, and the quality of a nomi-
nee often outweighs political allegiance. 24 This is reflected in the 
current make-up of the Conseil. The Conseil in March 1989 was the 
first to have a majority who had not been either members of Parlia-
ment or Government ministers. 25 Of the nine current members, 
three have predominantly legal distinction and two are principally 
administrators. 26 Finally, the prevalence of unanimous decisions27 
19 FR. CON ST. art. 56. Stone states that political affiliation is the single most important 
consideration for appointment to the Conseil. STONE, supra note 18, at 50. Those appointed 
are selected primarily from among former members of Parliament and former government 
ministers, but also from among past political advisors, judges (only three since the Conseil's 
creation in 1958), and law professors. Id.; Odon Vallet, Droit: Ces juges qui nous gouvernent 
(These judges who govern us), LE MONDE, Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Monde File. Vallet reports that the composition of the Conseil has been criticized by French 
scholars because none of its members has ever attended the exclusive ENA (Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration), a prestigious school for the study of administrative law. Id. 
20 BELL, supra note 5, at 34-35. 
21Id. at 34. 
22Id. Another factor that insulates the Conseil from political pressures is the privacy in 
which decisions are reached. Id. at 47. The forum is a private meeting room where only the 
Conseil's members are in attendance, the meetings are confidential, and no written records 
are kept. Id. The non public nature of the Conseil's deliberations might, on the other hand, 
permit the members greater discretion to make legislative decisions on an issue where there 
is little jurisprudence to look back upon. STONE, supra note 18, at 214. 
23 BELL, supra note 5, at 37. Similarly, United States Supreme Court Justices, like the 
Conseil's judges, are often appointed because of their political affiliation, but "one cannot 
predict how a justice will vote." THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 234-35 (Jesse H. 
Choper ed., 1987). "There is a real spark of independence that ignites men once they become 
immune from all political pressures." Id. at 235. This same concept applies to the Conseil 
judges. 
24 BELL, supra note 5, at 37. 
25Id. 
26Id. Even those members with political careers have law degrees. Id. President Robert 
Badinter, a former Minister of Justice, is also a law professor. Id. Marcel Rudloff, a leading 
senator, is also a practicing avocat [lawyer J. Id. 
27 BELL, supra note 5, at 47. 
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further evidences the psychological shift of a Conseil member's 
perspective from a retired politician to a constitutional judge. 
In addition to the political nature of the Conseil's composition,28 
there is inevitably some degree of politics involved in the context of 
decision-making because the issues are most often referred by mem-
bers of the legislature after political debate.29 But if the Conseil's 
decisions were based purely on political considerations, they would 
lack legitimacy and authority.30 Instead, the Conseil's legalistic ap-
proach to decision-making ensures legitimacy and authority: its 
opinions have legal application and are analyzed by lawyers as well 
as other courts.31 
B. Functions of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
The Conseil's functions include: overseeing presidential elections; 
acting as advisor to the President when he seeks to use emergency 
powers; and ruling on the constitutionality of treaties, organic laws, 
parliamentary standing orders, and legislation proposed by Parlia-
ment or the Government.32 This last function is the Conseil's pri-
mary one, and permits the referral of any proposed law to the 
Conseil upon request by the President, the Prime Minister, the 
President of either the Senate or the National Assembly, or any 
group of sixty senators or deputies.33 Review initiated by this latter 
group was made possible only as recently as 1974 through an amend-
ment to Article 61 of the Constitution.34 
C. Authority of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
The authority of the Conseil Constitutionnel is presented in Arti-
cle 62 of the Constitution.35 This Article states that a provision oflaw 
found to be unconstitutional may not be promulgated or imple-
28JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw 'TRADITION 137 (2d ed. 1990). The original 
composition of the Conseil evidenced its nonjudicial nature. Id. The Conseil's review of 
legislation was characterized as "political" rather than "judicial." Id. Recently, the Conseil's 
review has taken on a more judicial character as lawyers perceive the Conseil to be a more 
court-like institution. Id. 
29 See BELL, supra note 5, at 35. 
30 Id. at 35. 
31 Id. at 35, 229. 
32Id. at 30-32. 
33 FR. CONST. art. 61. 
34 See STONE, supra note 18, at 8. The Conseil has asserted its power to annul any part of 
the referred bill, including provisions that were not the subject of the arguments submitted 
in the referrals. Id. at 130. 
35 FR. CoNST. art. 62. 
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mented.36 It further states that the Conseil's decisions shall be bind-
ing on public powers and all administrative and judicial authorities.37 
Although the Conseil D'Etat, France's highest administrative court, 
and the Cour de Cassation, its highest ordinary court, are not legally 
bound by the Conseil's decisions, these courts have also recognized 
its constitutional interpretations as authoritative.38 The Conseil itself 
is not bound by its prior decisions, but rather refers to previous 
decisions in its pronouncements in order to establish continuity and 
maintain authority.39 
The constitutional control exercised by the Conseil is limited to 
an a priori basis: laws may only be reviewed prior to promulgation, 
and once a law has gone into effect its constitutionality may no 
longer be challenged.40 One criticism that has been leveled at such 
a system is that a law containing unconstitutional provisions can be 
promulgated simply because it was not first submitted to the Conseil 
for review.4l Furthermore, past laws may become unconstitutional as 
constitutional law develops, but will still be applied by the ordinary 
courts because a French judge does not have the power to declare 
a law unconstitutiona1.42 Another criticism of this a priori system is 
that an individual is not permitted access to constitutional justice, 
since laws can only be reviewed if they are referred by certain 
government officials and if they have not yet been promulgated.43 
On the other hand, an advantage of this system is that it allows a 
legislator to revise a law before enactment, in accordance with a 
Conseil decision.44 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38Vroom, supra note 6, at 310-11,313-14. 
39 BELL, supra note 5, at 51. When the Conseil wants to follow a prior decision, it repeats 
the particular wording of that decision verbatim, without citing to the decision. Id. This is a 
method practiced by the higher French courts. Id. 
4OVroom, supra note 6, at 270. This is unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which has a "case or 
controversy" requirement as provided for in article III, section 2 of the U.s. Constitution. 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 84 (2d ed. 1991). The requirement ensures 
that constitutional issues will be resolved only in the context of concrete disputes, rather than 
in the form of advisory opinions. Id. at 84-85. It also ensures that constitutional decisions are 
rendered for those actually injured by a constitutional violation. Id. at 85. 
41 Vroom, supra note 6, at 270-71. 
42Id. at 271. Judges of ordinary courts follow France's traditional view that the role of the 
judiciary be limited to the narrow interpretation of statutes. MERRYMAN, supra note 28, at 36. 
"The net image is of the judge as an operator of a machine designed and built by legislators. 
His function is a mechanical one. The great names of the civil law are not those of judges 
(who knows the name ofa civil law judge?) but those of legislators and scholars." Id. at 36-37. 
43Vroom, supra note 6, at 271. 
44 Id. at 272. 
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D. The Conseil Constitutionnel's Role as Protector of Individual 
Rights and Freedoms 
271 
The Conseil Constitutionnel was created to maintain the balance 
of power between the Government and Parliament, as well as to 
oversee the election process.45 The protection of individual rights 
and freedoms was not a major concern of the drafters of the 1958 
Constitution.46 At the time, fundamental values were not legally 
enforceable against Parliament and, in any case, the Government 
felt that it was not in a position to set out such values because that 
responsibility would be more appropriate for a Constituent Assem-
bly, rather than the government actors who actually drafted the 
Constitution.47 The Conseil has nevertheless managed to operate in 
the area of individual rights and freedoms and impose constitutional 
contro1.48 The Conseil did so in its Associations Law decision of July 
16, 1971, where, in ajudgment affirming the right to form political 
associations, the Conseil cited the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution 
as the basis for the decision, thus giving constitutional value not only 
to the Preamble but also to the sources it incorporates. 49 This group 
of sources having supralegislative value has come to be known as the 
bloc de constitutionalite (block of constitutionality), and consists of 
the written texts of the 1958 Constitution, the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man, and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution.50 In 
addition to substantive writings, the Conseil also recognizes the 
"fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic" as 
an integral part of the bloc de constitutionalite.51 
The inclusion of these other constitutional sources is important 
because although the 1958 Constitution mentions some rights, such 
45 Id. at 273. 
46 BELL, supra note 5, at 64. 
47 Id. It is also important to note that the drafters were subject to time constraints when 
they created this Constitution. Id. The Algerian crisis and certain conditions demanded by 
de Gaulle greatly accelerated the drafting process. Id. at 13. The rapid drafting of the 
Constitution caused a lack of attention to the enumeration of individual rights and freedoms. 
Id. 
48Vroom, supra note 6, at 274-75. 
49 See Decision of July 16, 1971, Con. const., 1971 ].0. 7114 (decision invalidating proposed 
legislation which would have subjected certain associations to the a priori approval of admin-
istrative or judicial authorities). It is notable that the court uses the phrase: "In the light of 
the Constitution, and especially of its Preamble." Id. This usage has been treated as giving all 
the Constitution's incorporated texts legally binding force. BELL, supra note 5, at 66. 
50 Vroom, supra note 6, at 275 n.48. 
5l Id. The "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic" are the laws 
promulgated during the first three Republics, relating to rights and liberties. Id. 
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as the equality of all citizens before the law,52 the Preamble to the 
Constitution announces a commitment to individual rights and free-
doms by incorporating the Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble 
to the 1946 Constitution. 53 The 1789 Declaration enunciates the 
principle that "the final end of every political institution is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These 
rights are those of liberty, property, security, and resistance to op-
pression. "54 The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution lists fundamen-
tal political, social, and economic rights that include equality as well 
as rights to asylum. 55 
What is interesting is that the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution 
was not considered legally binding at the time of its creation.56 The 
Preamble's purpose was to express good intentions, rather than to 
have any legal consequences.57 The Conseil changed that status, 
however, in the revolutionary Associations Law decision.58 Thus, this 
decision is significant because it gave constitutional force to the 
Preamble, the 1789 Declaration, and the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution. 59 The Associations Law decision also gave constitu-
tional force to the "fundamental principles recognized by the laws 
of the Republic, "60 which consist of provisions found in legislation 
passed prior to the Preamble of 1946.61 Thus, the Associations Law 
decision established the Conseil as the protector of individual rights 
and freedoms.62 Since the decision, the Conseil has continued to act 
as protector of individual rights and freedoms, establishing consti-
tutional values derived from the bloc de constitutionalite that are 
imposed upon the Government and Parliament in the process of 
creating legislation.63 
This restriction of the freedom of action of the legislature im-
posed by constitutional values has surfaced in the area of immigra-
52 FR. CONST. art. 2. This article provides: "France is an indivisible, lay, democratic, and 
social Republic. It ensures equality before the law for all citizens, without distinction as to 
origin, race, or religion. It respects all beliefs.» [d. 
53 BELL, supra note 5, at 66. 
54 [d. 
55 FR. CON ST. of 1946, pmbl. 
56 BELL, supra note 5, at 66. 
57 [d. 
58 Decision of July 16, 1971, Con. const., 1971 ].0. 7114; see also supra text accompanying 
n.47. 
59 BELL, supra note 5, at 66. 
60 Decision of July 16,1971, Con. const., 1971].0. 7114. 
61 Vroom, supra note 6, at 275 n.48. 
62 [d. at 275. 
63 BELL, supra note 5, at 71. 
1995) IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM DECISION 273 
tion, but there have been few Conseil decisions specifically pertain-
ing to the rights and freedoms of foreigners. 64 Recently, the French 
legislature, feeling pressure due to increased problems of immigra-
tion and asylum,65 responded by proposing a bill introducing laws 
aiming to curb these problems.66 The proposed legislation raised 
constitutional issues and both senators and deputies referred the 
laws to the Conseil Constitutionnel for review.67 The political aspects 
of the immigration and asylum problems in France provide a litmus 
test for the Conseil's constitutional authority, as detailed in the 
following discussion. 
II. IMMIGRATION AND AsYLUM IN FRANCE: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
A. End to Tradition of Liberal Immigration and Asylum Policies 
Although historically France encouraged immigration, its process 
of integration has been tested in recent years by a greater influx of 
people from North Mrica and Eastern Europe.68 According to the 
1990 census, an estimated fourteen million French nationals, nearly 
a quarter of the total population, are of recent foreign origin, either 
immigrants themselves or the children or grandchildren of immi-
64 Guendelsberger, supra note 11, at 682. 
65 Paul Webster, Migrant Laws Set France on the March, THE GUARDIAN, June 19, 1993, 
available in Westlaw, INT-News database. Protest leaders against the proposed immigration 
and asylum legislation (Pasqua Bill), including members of the Socialist and Communist 
parties, argue that the government is using immigrants and asylum-seekers as the scapegoat 
during France's economic crisis. Id. Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, author of the proposed 
legislation, argued that the bill was necessary because immigrants increase the crime rate and 
have an impact on unemployment. Emile Piey, French Parliament Approves Identity Checks Bill, 
REUTER NEWSWIRE,June 11, 1993, available in Westlaw, INT-News database. France's unem-
ployment rate, currently at 12%, is above the European Community average. Edouard Balladur 
and the triumph of politics, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1994, at 50. It is important to note that the 
article's author mentions that the government's high interest rate policies are partly respon-
sible for this high figure. Id. This economic crisis is said to have prompted resentment against 
foreigners, particularly immigrants from North Mrica. Roger Cohen, French Immigration Curbs 
Provoke Cabinet Rift, N.Y. TiMES at A12, June 23, 1993. This resentment is at least partly 
responsible for the pressures felt by the legislature and the government. See infra text accom-
panying notes 68-82. 
66 See Immigration QJtestions, supra note 1. 
67 Thierry Brehier, Le texte de M. Pasqua comporte des "atteintes excessives" aux droits fonda-
mentaux [The Pasqua Bill deals serious blows to fundamental rights], LE MONDE, Aug. 15-16, 
1993, at 7. 
68 SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATlON, AMBASSADE DE FRANCE A LONDRES (Press Service, 
French Embassy in London), France's Policy On Integrating Immigrants 1,4 [hereinafter "Policy 
on Integrating Immigrants"). Among the largest foreign communities are the Algerian and 
Moroccan. Id. 
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grants. 59 Of the approximately 3.6 million foreigners in France, 1.3 
million were European Union (EU: formally the European Commu-
nity) nationals and 2.3 million were from outside the EU.70 Overall, 
foreigners account for roughly six percent of the total population. 71 
Although France does not have a large foreign population in com-
parison to other European countries, its European population has 
decreased dramatically over the past quarter century.72 In 1970, 
seventy-five percent of foreigners living in France were Europeans, 
while today, less than forty percent of the foreign population are 
Europeans.73 Arabs and Africans account for almost fifty percent of 
the foreign population.74 Roughly 100,000 legal immigrants enter 
the country every year along with between 35,000 and 100,000 illegal 
immigrants. 75 Applications for political asylum in France range from 
between 30,000 and 60,000 annually.75 Considering these demo-
69Id. at 2. The same census showed that metropolitan France has the following demograph-
ics: 
Id. 
people born in France who acquired citizenship: 
people born outside France who acquired citizenship: 
total number of French citizens: 
people born outside France who acquired citizenship: 
foreigners born outside France: 
total number of immigrants: 
foreigners born outside France: 
foreigners born in France: 
total number of foreigners: 
70Id. at 3. 
51. 7 million 
13 million 
53 million 
1.3 million 
28 million 
4.1 million 
2.84 million 
74 million 
3.6 million 
71 Policy on Integrating Immigrants, supra note 68, at 3. Approximately 40% of the foreign 
population is concentrated in the Paris area. Id. 
72 France; Zero Option, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 57. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. Of the 100,000 legal immigrants entering the country each year (not including foreign 
students, seasonal workers and asylum seekers), roughly 25% are permanent workers from 
either the EC or one of the Asian or Mrican countries involved in an agreement with France, 
35% are family members of immigrants already residing in France, 20% are foreigners 
married to French citizens, and 15% are political refugees. Id. 
76 Frances Kerry, French Parliament Approves Immigration Law, REUTER NEWSWIRE, June 18, 
1993, available in Westlaw, INT-News database. Although the number of asylum requests seems 
high, the peak for applications occurred in 1989 and 1990 at about 60,000, and fell to under 
29,000 in 1992. Claire Rosemberg, Rnw On Political Asylum Threatens Power-Sharing Pact, 
REUTER EuR. COMMUNITY REp., Aug. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; 
see also Bruno Frappat, Le Projet de Revision Constitutionnelle Adopte par Le Conseil des Ministres 
(The Project of Constitutional Revision Adopted I7J the Council of Ministers), LE MONDE, Oct. 21, 
1993, available in LEXlS, World Library, Monde File. Of those 1992 requests, 30% were 
granted asylum. Id. Charles Pasqua, the Interior Minister, argues that those whose requests 
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graphic pressures, the right wing Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, 
received tremendous support for his proposed bill which aimed at 
"zero immigration. "77 
The effort to clamp down on immigration and asylum, however, 
challenges France's traditional role as a haven for immigrants and 
asylum-seekers. Historically, the French government has supported 
a number of policies aimed at protecting immigrants. 78 For example, 
even today expulsion of foreigners illegally in France is subject to 
legal and procedural guarantees under the supervision of the courts, 
which reflects a basic principle of French freedom.79 Furthermore, 
foreigners legally settled in France have rights guaranteed by the 
Republic, especially a right to protection against all forms of racial 
discrimination.80 Asylum, however, is treated in a slightly different 
manner. Although France traditionally has provided asylum for po-
litical refugees,8! the official view always has been that granting 
asylum for people leaving their countries because of economic 
difficulties encountered in these countries is an abuse of France's 
general policy of welcoming political refugees.82 
B. New Legislation Geared Towards "Zero Immigration" 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua sought to tighten the country's 
immigration and asylum policies through the bill he proposed to 
Parliament during its spring and extraordinary summer sessions of 
1993.83 The "Pasqua Bill" had four aims: to supplement the law on 
are turned down do not return to their native countries, but rather disappear into France 
while their appeals are pending. Id. It is important to note that immigration and political 
asylum are different concepts. Immigration is the term for settlement outside of the country 
of birth of a person who for any reason left his homeland. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1990), at 414 [hereinafter UN ENCYCLO-
PEDIA]. Asylum, on the other hand, is a wild card. It is the granting of refuge to aliens who 
are exposed to racial or political persecution in their own country. Id. at 64. In light of the 
decrease in asylum applications, the debate over political asylum seems misplaced, and is 
rather a debate over immigration. 
77 France; Zero option, supra note 72, at 57. The report states that 94% of the French 
population believes racism to be widespread and that 71 % of the French population com-
plains that there are "too many Arabs." Id. 
78 Policy on Integrating Immigrants, supra note 68, at 1. 
79Id. at 4. 
80Id. 
8l FR. CONST. of 1946, pmbl. The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution provides: "Any person 
persecuted for his activities on behalf of freedom has the right of asylum in the territories of 
the Republic." !d. para. 4. 
82 See Policy for Integrating Immigrants, supra note 68, at 4. 
83 Immigration Questions, supra note 1. Article 39 of the Constitution gives Pasqua the legal 
basis for the right to propose his bill. FR. CONST. art. 39. This article provides: "The right to 
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the rights of alien residents; to ensure the proper integration of 
alien families; to stop entry and residence procedures from being 
circumvented; and, to prevent illegal immigration.84 To achieve its 
aim of supplementing the law on the rights of alien residents, the 
bill proposed to clarify the conditions under which persons seeking 
refugee status may be denied permission to enter France.85 In par-
ticular, although persons seeking refugee status shall be allowed to 
stay temporarily on French territory until the French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons86 has rendered a final 
decision on their request, the government retains both the right to 
revoke or the right to refuse to renew their temporary visas.87 The 
law also gives the government the right not only to refuse political 
asylum to foreigners whose requests were refused by another EU 
Member State, but even more exceptionally to deny them any right 
to appeal that decision.88 
To achieve its aim of ensuring the proper integration of alien 
families, the bill places several restrictions on family reunification.89 
To achieve its aim of stopping the circumvention of entry and 
residence procedures, the bill gives mayors the authority to call 
upon public prosecutors to defer a marriage suspected of being a 
propose laws belongs concurrently to the Prime Minister and to members of Parliament." ld. 
Government bills [pro jets de loi) are considered by the Council of Ministers after the advice 
of the Conseil D'Etat, and are tabled in one of the chambers. ld. Finance bills are submitted 
first to the National Assembly. ld. 
84 Communique du Conseil des Ministres [Press Release from the Council of Ministers) 
June 2,1993 (on file with the B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv.) [hereinafter Communique). The 
second aim will not be discussed in this Note because it is not pertinent. The bill changes 
certain conditions under which family reunification is allowed. ld. 
85 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11727. 
86 ld.; Communique, supra note 84. The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons is responsible for recognizing the status of political refugees, and for ensur-
ing the legal and administrative protection of the persons granted asylum. Policy for Integrat-
ing Immigrants, supra note 68, at 9. 
87 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11727. 
88 SeeBrehier, supra note 67, at 7; Rosemberg, supra note 76. This provision was of particular 
importance to the French government as it serves to allay fears that France would become a 
haven for asylum-seekers whose requests were rejected by other EC member states but who 
would be given free movement in the EC under the Schengen Accord. Rosemberg, supra note 
76; see also Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common 
Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, AgreementJune 14,1985, Convention 
June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement and Convention). 
89 Communique, supra note 84. Although discussion of this particular aim is beyond the 
scope of this Note, the bill sought to achieve proper integration by: (I) extending the required 
residency period for an alien wishing to be joined by his or her spouse and children from 
one year to two years and by, (2) refusing to allow aliens admitted to France as students to 
bring their families into the country under the family reunification provision since their 
student status should not lead to their permanent integration. ld. 
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marriage of convenience.9o In the area of asylum, the bill provides 
that persons whose applications for political asylum are clearly un-
founded will not be admitted.91 
The aim of preventing illegal immigration responds to a failure 
to execute expulsion decisions because officials lack identity or 
travel documents for expelled persons.92 The bill proposes to in-
crease the time period for administrative detention of an alien 
awaiting expulsion from seven to ten days in cases where the appro-
priate travel documents are not presented.93 Furthermore, the bill 
provides for the implementation of a procedure for judicial deten-
tion of a period not to exceed three months for an alien who refuses 
to present the proper travel documents in order to avoid expulsion.94 
In addition to the aims laid out in the Pasqua Bill, the new 
legislation also seeks to tighten the general conditions imposed on 
the entry and duration of stay of foreigners.95 One provision in 
particular gives police the power to perform random identity checks 
on people whether or not they were acting suspiciously.96 This gives 
the police much greater power because the previous rule required 
that the police have a reasonable belief that a crime either had been 
or was about to be committed before demanding someone's pa-
pers.97 The wording of the law, based on a 1946 decree, states: 
"[p]ersons of foreign nationality must be in a position to present 
90 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
91 Communique, supra note 84. 
92 [d. 
93 [d.; Brehier, supra note 67, at 7. The detention period was six days with the possibility of 
a 24 hour extension, and the new law seeks to increase the extension from 24 hours to 72 
hours. [d. 
94 [d. The Pasqua Bill would change a previous law which authorized the courts to sentence 
an alien, who refused to present the proper documents in order to block the expulsion 
process, to a prison term. [d. The Pasqua Bill also purports to reduce the overcrowding in 
prisons by authorizing the courts to defer the prison term and to put the alien in detention 
for a period of up to three months. [d. 
95 Picy, supra note 65; French Watchdog Rejects Some Clauses in Nationality Law, REUTER 
NEWSWIRE,July 21,1993, available in Westlaw, INT-News database. In addition to the Pasqua 
Bill, the French Government also proposed, and the French Parliament approved, a contro-
versial change to the Civil Code laws relating to nationality. French Watchdog Rejects Some 
Clauses in Nationality Law, supra. Under the new law, children of immigrants that are born 
on French soil will have to apply for citizenship status between the ages of 16 and 21 rather 
than acquiring it automatically at age 18, as the previous law prescribed. [d. In its decision 
reviewing the constitutionality of this law, the Conseil Constitutionnel stated that the law did 
not violate the constitutional principle of equality. Decision of July 20,1993, Con. const., 1993 
].0. 10391. This provision was adopted into the French Civil Code on July 22, 1993. Code 
Civil [c. CIV.] art. 44. 
96 Picy, supra note 65. 
97 [d. 
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documents on the basis of which they are authorized to travel or 
reside in France in response to any request by the police. "98 Al-
though these new laws received widespread support from the French 
population,99 it was clear, at least to sixty members of Parliament and 
certain Government officials, that application of certain provisions 
would infringe upon the individual freedoms and rights of foreigners. 
III. THE CONS ElL CONSTITUTIONNEL'S DECISION STRIKING DOWN 
THE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 
A. Methods oj Interpretation 
Before promulgation of the new immigration and asylum legisla-
tion, more than the required sixty members of Parliament, including 
Socialist senators and Socialist and Communist deputies, referred 
the legislation to the Conseil Constitutionnel for review of its con-
stitutionality.lOo The Conseil's decision, the longest it has rendered 
98 French Senate Drops Disputed Immigration Amendment, REUTER NEWSWIRE, June 30, 1993, 
available in Westlaw, INT-News database (quoting proposed amendment to Pasqua Bill). 
Recognizing that this draft law challenged provisions of the constitution prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, one member of Parliament proposed an amendment reading that 
the random police identity checks would be based on "any evidence, other than race, that a 
person is foreign." Cohen, supra note 65. This amendment was rejected by the Senate on June 
30, 1993, and the wording of the 1946 decree was adopted. French Senate Drops Disputed 
Immigration Amendment, supra. 
99 See French Back Tightened Nationality Law, Says Poll, REUTER NEWSWIRE, May 12, 1993, 
available in Westlaw, INT-News database. The French newspaper, LE PARISIEN, reported poll 
results showing that 76% of those questioned agreed that mayors should be allowed to refuse 
to issue marriage licenses if they suspect that a wedding was arranged solely for a foreigner 
to obtain French citizenship. Id. It must be noted, however, that wide support for legislation 
on immigration and asylum comes during a period of economic crisis in France, where 
unemployment is high, prompting resentment against foreigners. French Parliament Passes 
Tough Immigration Law, REUTER LIBRARY REp., July 13, 1993, available in LEXlS, News 
Library, Curnws File. A poll by the Interior Ministry reported that 89% of those questioned 
favored restrictions on marriages of convenience and 57% approved of tougher regulations 
for asylum-seekers. Id. 
100 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722. The Constitution provides in its 
Article 61 that sixty deputies or senators may refer laws, before they are promulgated, to the 
Conseil, which shall decide on their compatibility with the Constitution. FR. CONST. art. 61. 
The system of referral and subsequent review of legislation relies heavily upon the willingness 
of government officials or members of Parliament to submit a law to the Conseil. BELL, supra 
note 5, at 56. Bell illustrates this with the law of July 13, 1990. Id. The law penalized persons 
convicted of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia, by depriving them of their civil rights. 
Id. Despite the obvious violation of constitutional principles inherent in the law, no member 
of Parliament or of the Government was willing to submit the matter to the Conseil for review. 
Id. Since the 1974 amendment allowing referrals to the Conseil by sixty senators or deputies, 
97% of all referrals have been of Parliamentary origin. STONE, supra note 18, at 57-58. In an 
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since its creation in 1958,101 thoroughly examined the controversial 
Pasqua Bill. Although only eight out of the fifty-one Articles com-
prising the law were censured by the Conseil, the decision is ex-
tremely important, representing a watershed for the Conseil in its 
role as the protector of individual liberties. The methods of inter-
pretation employed by the Conseil in its decision-making process 
provide some insight into the Conseil's achievement of this goal. 
Article 61 of the Constitution gives the Conseil the authority to 
declare a provision unconstitutional. I02 Subsequently, that provision 
may be neither promulgated nor applied. 103 Apart from striking 
down a provision completely, the Conseil also may declare it consti-
tutional but only under certain restrictions.104 The Conseil has de-
veloped techniques of interpretation that provide guidance as to the 
manner in which a questionable provision can be made compatible 
with the Constitution. lo5 The Conseil accomplishes this guidance 
through its "reserves d'interpretation,"106 which are statements that 
certain provisions are only found to be constitutional, and therefore 
can only be promulgated, to the extent that they are read in a 
attempt to increase the jurisdiction of the Conseil Constitutionnel and avoid this reliance on 
the willingness of politicians and officials to refer laws, the President of the Republic and the 
President of the Conseil recently proposed that the ordinary courts of France be permitted 
to refer questionable laws to the Conseil, even after the laws had been promulgated. BELL, 
supra note 5, at 55-56. This proposal was the second effort (the first occurred during the 
1977 election) to give private citizens the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of 
laws which they considered to violate their fundamental rights. Aucoin, supra note 5, at 
455-456. The express terms of the reformers' proposed amendments to the Constitution 
would have limited the Conseil's new jurisdiction to laws challenged as violations of funda-
mental rights. Id. at 457. In 1990, however, Parliament rejected the proposal. Id. at 460. 
In Germany, judicial referral is one way to bring the issue of the constitutionality of a statute 
before the German Constitutional Court. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 
376 (5th ed. 1988). If another court feels that a statute relevant to its decision is unconstitu-
tional, it must refer the constitutional issue to the Constitutional Court. Id. The Constitutional 
Court decides only that issue, and returns the record to the referring court, which decides 
on the other issues. Id. 
101 Brehier, supra note 67, at 7. 
I02FR. CaNST. art. 61. 
I03FR. CaNST. art. 62. 
104Vroom, supra note 6, at 288. 
105 BELL, supra note 5, at 53. 
106 Reserves d'interpretation may be translated as canons of construction. Because the reader 
may be unfamiliar with the concept of these reserves, further explanation by the author is 
warranted. These reserves are measures taken by the Conseil for dealing with legislation that 
has doubtful constitutionality. See Vroom, supra note 6, at 288. They constitute principles of 
judicial restraint, unlike United States Supreme Court interpretive measures that include 
textual and historical analysis, as well as reliance on the long-standing authority of Supreme 
Court decisions. Id. 
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particular way prescribed by the Conseil. 107 This movement of the 
Conseil, away from decisions providing a formal analysis of whether 
a provision was constitutional to a more insightful analysis involving 
more "affirmative control over constitutional adjudication , "108 began 
with the Security and Liberty decision109 of January, 1981. 
The first of these reserves d'interpretation is the so-called interpreta-
tion itself, where the Conseil interprets the text of the provision so 
as to conform with the ConstitutionYo In the Security and Liberty 
decision, the provision in question made it an offense to obstruct 
the passage of vehicles on the highway.lll The argument against the 
provision was that it would interfere with the right to strike, i.e., 
establish pickets and demonstrations.ll2 In its decision, the Conseil 
stated that: "there is no possibility that the application of these 
provisions will, in any manner, prevent or interfere with the lawful 
exercise of the right to strike or union action. "113 As a result, the law 
was upheld as constitutional with the "reservation" that it could not 
be applied against strikers, because that application would be un-
constitutional.1I4 With this interpretation, the Conseil managed to 
uphold the law while, at the same time, removing its sting. 
The second interpretive technique employed by the Conseil is 
making an addition to the provision to render it constitutional. ll5 In 
the Security and Liberty decision, the challenged provision stated that 
a magistrate court could authorize a twenty-four hour extension of 
the detention period for criminal suspects in police custody.ll6 
Rather than striking down the provision as unconstitutional, the 
Conseil responded to the opposition's argument by adding that the 
magistrate ordering the extension would "necessarily have to exam-
107 STONE, supra note 18, at 88-89. It is important to note that these canons of construction 
are employed by the Conseil as a means for conditioning the constitutionality of a challenged 
law or provision. BELL, supra note 5, at 53-54. 
108 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 288. 
109 Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981 ].0.308. 
110 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 288. 
111 Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981].0.309. 
112Id. at 309-10. 
1I3Id. 
1I4Id. 
115 BELL, supra note 5, at 54. 
116Vroom, supra note 6, at 284. The provision involved a 24-hour extension of garde a vue 
(police custody) in certain cases. Id. Normally, the custody period was limited to a period of 
24 hours with the option of a 24-hour extension authorized by the Procureur (public prose-
cutor). Id. The new provision called for an additional 24-hour extension that could be 
authorized by a judge for those suspected of certain crimes. Id. 
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ine the file in order to authorize the twenty-four hour extension of 
detention."ll7 Presumably, this provision was added to prevent any 
arbitrary decision by the magistrate. The decision also included 
another example of the addition technique. A provision relating to 
police identity checks provided the possibility of a hearing before 
the Procureur de la Ripublique,IIB but the Conseil, in upholding the 
provision, read the language to mean that there was a constitutional 
right to the hearing.u9 
The last technique, or reserve d'interpretation, is the injunction, a 
type of directive given by the Conseil specitying how a certain pro-
vision is to be applied.120 This directive is designed to guard against 
subsequent abuses in the application of a particular law.l2l In the 
Security and Liberty decision, the Conseil issued special instructions 
to administrative and judicial authorities relating to identity 
checks.122 The Conseil directed the judicial and administrative 
authorities to ensure respect for the rules created by the legislature 
regarding identity checks, and admonished the competent courts to 
censure and punish any abuses of the law.123 
Employing these techniques allows the Conseil to uphold other-
wise unconstitutional legislation, thus avoiding the need for Parlia-
ment to reconvene and draft a new law in conformity with the 
Conseil's decision.124 The development of these techniques was of 
crucial importance in the Security and Liberty decision, where the 
Conseil managed to uphold a politically controversial piece of leg-
islation but at the same time establish constitutional norms to which 
the legislature was forced to submit.125 Yet the Conseil's mode of 
interpretation may be met with skepticism because it involves the 
Conseil dictating, often word-for-word, the terms of new laws.126 
Critics argue that by creating binding interpretations of law, the 
Conseil is assuming the role of a policymaker making new law.127 
l17Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981].0. 310. 
118Vroom, supra note 6, at 284. The Procureur de la Ripublique is a public prosecutor. Id. 
119Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981 ].0.312. 
120 BELL, supra note 5, at 54. 
121 Vroom, supra note 6, at 289. 
122Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, 1981 ].0.44312. 
123Id. 
124 BELL, supra note 5, at 55. The inconvenience to Parliament is great because the Conseil's 
decision is rendered at the end of Parliament's session, so Parliament may have to meet in 
an extraordinary session in order to get the bill passed. Id. 
125Vroom, supra note 6, at 289. 
126STONE, supra note 18, at 24l. 
127Id. 
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B. Constitutional Principles and Sources 
On August 13, 1993, the Conseil was again placed in the position 
of having to rule on the constitutionality of the highly controversial 
piece of legislation known as the Pasqua Bill relating to the control 
of immigration and the conditions on the entry and stay of foreign-
ers in France.128 In this decision relating to the rights and freedoms 
of foreigners, the Conseil relied upon the bloc de constitutionalite, l29 
and the constitutional principles, specifically equality and individual 
liberty, laid out in those texts. 130 This reliance upon textual sources 
of constitutional principles demonstrates the restraint with which 
the Conseil exercises constitutional control.131 The Conseil does not 
consider itself the authority on constitutional law, and its decisions 
always refer to the constitutional principles and the sources from 
which they are derived.132 
Yet it could be argued that the Conseil is forced to go through 
the exercise of interpretation, and in practice it is really creating 
new law. The Conseil's method of addressing provisions of the law 
point-by-point with respect to the status and meaning of the consti-
tutional principles invoked has been criticized as formalistic. 133 The 
expansion of constitutional jurisprudence might be seen as a self-
defense mechanism for the Conseil, reducing the uncertainty of 
lawmakers and establishing better doctrinal standards for the judg-
ing of jurisprudential coherence.134 It may also attract the support 
of legal specialists "in efforts to fend off criticism of its expanded 
role as a policymaker."135 There is less protest of the Conseil's refer-
ences to constitutional texts, however, over decisions based on penal 
law, where provisions are annulled on grounds that they violated the 
principle of equality or elements of due process. 136 This is perhaps 
because these principles are enshrined in the 1789 Declaration and 
have been extended into code law.137 This longstanding authority 
128 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722. 
129 BELL, supra note 5, at 65-71. 
130 [d. at 65-66. 
131 Vroom, supra note 6, at 303. In its early decisions, the Conseil cited to "fundamental 
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic," but in recent years has abandoned this 
vague reference and adopted more concrete textual sources. [d. 
132 [d. 
133 See STONE, supra note 18, at 18, 133-34. 
134 [d. at 134. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 211. 
137 [d. 
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represents a government consensus as to their validity.13s The Immi-
gration and Asylum decision was not based on penal law, but it did 
center upon issues of equality and due process. Furthermore, the 
Conseil's rulings on the Pasqua Bill provisions are the result of 
careful interpretation of these constitutional principles. 
The first principle is that of equality under the law. 139 This princi-
ple receives somewhat limited treatment in Article 2 of the 1958 
Constitution, which proclaims that the Republic "ensures equality 
before the law for all citizens, without distinction as to origin, race, 
or religion."14o To evoke this principle, the Conseil relies more heav-
ily on Article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, which 
proclaims that: "the law must be the same for all, whether it punishes 
or protects."141 Moreover, the entire Preamble to the 1946 Constitu-
tion devotes itself to equality.142 Violation of these principles of 
equality results in the invalidation of a law. 143 Therefore, the legisla-
ture is obliged to justify any provision of law that is facially discrimi-
natory.144 But the principle of equality does not prevent the legisla-
ture from passing laws that treat people differently from others 
because of their particular situation.145 A difference in treatment is 
justified if it depends upon the particular situation a person is found 
in, rather than the birth or social status of that person.146 In its Social 
Measures decision of January 22, 1990, the Conseil affirmed that with 
respect to foreigners, the legislature may make specific provisions 
on the condition that it respect: (1) the international agreements 
to which France is a party and, (2) the fundamental rights and 
freedoms provided for in the Constitution.147 Only where the Conseil 
is persuaded that the difference in treatment is the result of arbi-
138 STONE, supra note 18, at 21l. 
139 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722. This list of principles only 
points out those that are discussed in the Conseil's decision. There are many other principles 
that the Conseil relies upon but that are not discussed in this Note (such as the freedom of 
association or the freedom of education). BELL, supra note 5, at 149-5l. 
140 FR. CaNST. art. 2. 
141 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, art. 6 (Fr. 1789) [hereinafter 
Declaration of 1789]. 
142FR. CaNST. of 1946, pmbl. The preamble proclaims racial and religious equality (~ 1), 
equality between the sexes (~ 2), equality as to public burdens (~ 12), and equal access to 
education (~ 13). [d. 
143BELL, supra note 5, at 202. 
144 [d. 
145 [d. at 202-03, 223. As long as Parliament can justiry discrimination in a particular law, 
the Conseil will almost always defer to its assessment. [d. at 223. 
146 [d. at 203. 
147 BELL, supra note 5, at 203 (quoting Conseil Decision of Jan. 22, 1990). 
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trary legislation, rather than the furtherance of a legitimate policy 
objective, will it declare a violation of the principle of equality.148 
The second principle is individual liberty. This principle has been 
greatly developed by the Conseil but is based primarily on Article 2 
of the 1789 Declaration which proclaims that: "[the] ultimate pur-
pose of every political institution is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are to liberty, prop-
erty, security, and resistance to oppression. "149 Article 2 of the 1789 
Declaration was drafted in response to the concern of government's 
arbitrary restraint on the freedom of action.150 Article 7 addresses 
this concern where it states that: "[n]o individual may be accused, 
arrested, or detained except where the law so prescribes, and in 
accordance with the procedures it has laid down. "151 Yet Article 7 
also recognizes the importance of maintaining public order against 
freedom of action.152 Due to the general nature of this fundamental 
principle of liberty, the Conseil sought to construct clearer constitu-
tional principles to establish a framework in which the legislature 
could act.153 
This tension between individual freedom and the limits imposed 
on it by public order required the Conseil to refine the principle of 
liberty, based on Article 2 of the Declaration.154 The principle of 
individual liberty was invoked by the Conseil in the Vehicle Searches 
decision of January 1977 as a justification for restricting actions of 
the State in relation to individuals,155 a principle protected by judi-
cial authorities under Article 66 of the Constitution.156 The Vehicle 
Searches decision is significant in that it did not limit the concept of 
individual liberty to vehicle searches by police, but instead inter-
preted it broadly by finding a right to privacy in the right to be free 
from arbitrary detention, as well as the right to freedom of move-
148 [d. at 223-24. 
149 Declaration of 1789, supra note 141, art. 2; see also BELL, supra note 5, at 140. 
150 See BELL, supra note 5, at 139. 
151 Declaration of 1789, supra note 141, art. 7. 
152 [d. at art. 7. Article 7 provides: "[any 1 citizen charged or detained by virtue of a law must 
obey it immediately; resistance renders him culpable." [d. 
153BELL, supra note 5, at 139. 
154 [d. at 140. 
155Decision of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., 1977 ].0.344. In this decision, the government 
proposed a law giving police broad powers to search vehicles. [d. The Conseil rejected the 
law, saying that it violated the constitutional principle of individual freedom that is protected 
by judicial authorities under article 66 of the Constitution. [d. 
156FR. CONST. art. 66. Article 66 of the Constitution provides: "No one may be detained 
arbitrarily. The judiciary, the guardian of individual liberty, ensures respect for this principle 
in circumstances provided for by law." [d. 
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ment.157 Although this broad concept is not expressly mentioned in 
any of the texts of the bloc de constitutionalite, the Conseil found it 
in Article 66 of the Constitution and in the "fundamental principles 
recognized by the laws of the Republic. "158 
C. The Basis for the Conseil's Decision of August 13, 1993, 
Regarding the Pasqua Bill 
At the beginning of its unanimous decision, the Conseil an-
nounced the constitutional principles which applied to the pro-
posed legislation. It stated that: 
no principle nor any rule of constitutional value assures 
foreigners of general and absolute rights of entry and stay 
on the national territory: the conditions of their entry and 
stay can be restricted by administrative policy measures, 
deriving from specific rules, which confer extended powers 
upon the public authority; that the legislator can then 
pursue those general policy objectives which it sets itself: 
that in the legal realm, foreigners are situated differently 
from French nationals; that the assessment of the constitu-
tionality of measures the legislator believes should be taken 
can neither be made by comparing provisions of successive 
laws, nor from a law's conformity with the stipulations of 
international conventions, but emerges only from testing 
the law against requirements of a constitutional order. 159 
The Conseil added, however, that: 
if the legislator takes specific measures with regard to for-
eigners, it must respect the fundamental liberties and 
rights of constitutional value recognized for all who reside 
on the territory of the Republic: that if these liberties and 
rights must be reconciled with the safeguarding of public 
order, which constitutes an objective of constitutional 
value, included among those rights and liberties is the 
principle of individual liberty and safety, notably the free-
dom to come and go, the freedom to marry, the right to 
lead a normal family life [.]160 
Finally, the Conseil recalled that: 
157 Vroom, supra note 6, at 280. 
158 [d. 
159 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
160 [d. 
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foreigners can insist upon the right, which is exclusive to 
certain among them, recognized by the fourth paragraph 
of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, in which the 
French people solemnly declared their adherence to the 
principle that: "[any] person persecuted for his activities 
on behalf of freedom has the right of asylum in the terri-
tories of the Republic. "161 
The Conseil made it clear that foreigners could not benefit from 
all of the rights enjoyed by French nationals, but that some consti-
tutional values clearly do apply to them. This statement affirmed an 
earlier decision by the Conseil which held that principles of individ-
ual liberty apply to citizens and foreigners alike.162 That decision, 
handed down on January 9, 1980, marked the first time that the 
Conseil relied directly on Article 66 of the Constitution to declare 
a provision unconstitutional because it violated a foreigner's individ-
ual liberty. 163 
The January 9, 1980 decision quoted above is an example of the 
Conseil's willingness to allow discriminatory legislation if the dis-
crimination is not arbitrary, because the Conseil recognizes that 
foreigners may be situated differently than French nationals.164 The 
Conseil specifically stated that foreigners find themselves in a situ-
ation different from that of French nationals and are subject to 
different treatment by the laws passed in the legislature. 165 The 
Conseil distinguished between the rights of the citizen, i.e., rights 
that apply exclusively to French nationals, and human rights, i.e., 
rights that apply to all persons, not only the French.166 For example, 
only French citizens have equal rights to settle in France. 167 
161Id. 
162 See Decision of Jan. 9, 1980, Con. const., 1980 ].0. 84; see also Vroom, supra note 6, at 
280-81. 
163 See Decision of Jan. 9, 1980, Con. con st. , 1980 ].0.85. The Conseil rejected a provision 
that called for a seven-day period of administrative detention of an alien before intervention 
of a judicial officer because "individual liberty can only be said to be protected if the judge 
intervenes in the shortest period possible." Id. 
164 BELL, supra note 5, at 204. 
165 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
166 Thierry Brehier, Le Conseil Constitutionnel Attenue la Rigeur de la Loi Sur L Immigration, 
LE MONDE, Aug. 15-16, 1993, at 1; see also BELL, supra note 5, at 203. The 1988 electoral 
campaign in France involved a debate as to whether immigrants should be given the right to 
vote. Id. It was presumed that this right would require an amendment to the Constitution. Id. 
167 BELL, supra note 5, at 203. 
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This doctrine surfaced in another decision rendered by the Con-
seil on July 20, 1993.168 In the Citizenship Rights decision, the Conseil 
upheld legislation that treated foreigners differently regarding citi-
zenship rights. 169 The Conseil held that a foreigner who marries a 
French national must wait for a period of two years in order to 
acquire French citizenship; a foreigner is exempt from the two year 
waiting period, however, if the couple has a baby before or after the 
marriage po The Conseil pointed out that the principle of equality 
does not hinder the establishment of different rules for citizens and 
aliens as long as the different treatment prescribed by the law is 
consistent with the law's underlying policies and objectives. l7l 
In its Social Measures decision of January 22, 1990, the Conseil 
presaged this reasoning by stating that ''with regard to foreigners, 
the legislature may make specific provisions on condition that it 
respects international agreements to which France is a party and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of constitutional value recognized 
for all who reside in the territory of the Republic."172 This decision 
imposed a general constraint on the legislature to respect equality 
in the realm of human rights. 173 The Conseil also stated, however, 
that the legislature is limited by protection of other rights as well, 
in that it must have an objective reason for discriminating against 
foreigners. 174 Therefore, a reference to the "principle of equality" by 
the Conseil applies both to citizens and foreigners. 175 
The Social Measures decision illustrates this point because the 
Conseil declared that the French principle of equality gave resident 
foreigners the same rights of access to government benefits as 
French citizens.176 The Conseil reasoned that the law's policy of 
helping elderly persons with inadequate funds applied equally to 
foreigners and citizens.177 Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that the 
equality required by the Constitution does not mean providing the 
same treatment to everyone under all circumstances, because simply 
168 See Decision of July 20, 1993, Con. const., 1993.J.O. 10391. 
1691d. 
170Id. 
1711d. 
172Decision of Jan. 22, 1990, quoted in BELL, supra note 5, at 203. 
1731d. 
1741d. 
1751d. 
176 Guendelsberger, supra note 11, at 686. 
177 BELL, supra note 5, at 204. 
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being a foreigner does justify different treatment in some cases.178 
The Conseil expressed this idea by stating that laws providing differ-
ent treatments and procedures in the context of entry into, and 
expulsion from France, were constitutional because of the different 
positions of foreigners and French nationals. 179 
The Conseil's latest decision regarding the rights of foreigners in 
France comes in the midst of increased political debate over the 
status of immigrants and asylum-seekers.18o In its decision, the Con-
seil was forced to examine the constitutionality of the Pasqua Bill 
provisions restricting the rights of foreigners, specifically provisions 
relating to police identity checks, extension of administrative deten-
tion periods, control of marriages of convenience, and limitations 
on political asylum.181 
D. General Conditions of Entry and Stay of Foreigners: Police 
Identity Checks 
The Conseil's interpretative approach is exemplified by its treat-
ment of police identity checks. As promulgated, the provision of the 
new law regarding police identity checks required that persons of a 
foreign nationality always carry the documents authorizing their 
presence in France, and produce them upon request by the police. 182 
The authors of the referral to the Conseil argued that this provision 
deprives foreigners of the legal guarantees prescribed by the Con-
stitution.183 Specifically, the opposing deputies and senators pointed 
to violations of the principles of individual liberty and equality.184 
The argument claimed that the law imposed an obligation on for-
eigners which did not apply to French nationals. 185 
The Conseil noted, however, that the legislature is in a position 
to require the detention of foreigners, as well as the carrying and 
production of documents attesting to the conditions of foreigners' 
178 See Decision of January 9,1990, Con. const., 1990 ].0.464,465. 
179Id. 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 68-77. 
lSI Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const. 1993 ].0. 11722. Other issues discussed in this 
decision, such as expulsion from the French territory or visa requirements, are beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
182Id. at 11723. The decision quotes article 5 of the bill as follows: "[persons) of foreign 
nationality must be in a position to present documents on the basis of which they are 
authorized to travel or reside in response to any request by the police." Id. 
183Id. 
184Id. 
185Id. 
.. 
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entry and stay in France. 186 The Conseil went on to say that in these 
situations the legislature may also impose additional requirements, 
except: (1) where the foreigner has committed an offense or, (2) 
there is an absence of particular circumstances relating to the pre-
vention of the disruption of the public order.187 
The Conseil reiterated that foreigners and French nationals are 
placed in different situations and thus there was no violation of the 
principle of equality. 188 This statement affirmed the Conseil's reason-
ing in the decision of January 9, 1990, where the Conseil stated that 
simply being a foreigner places a person in a different legal situation 
and thus warrants different treatment under the laws. I89 Although 
the Conseil's present decision did not criticize or condemn the 
practice of random police identity checks, it did specify that their 
implementation must be based exclusively on objective criteria, leav-
ing the determination of that criteria to the police. 190 The Conseil 
noted that discriminatory implementation of identity checks would 
be contrary to constitutional rules and principles and therefore not 
permitted.191 It added that it was the duty of the judicial and admin-
istrative authorities to ensure this aspect of the Constitution and to 
punish any conduct in violation of the Conseil's dictate. 192 
The Conseil emphasized that only under this reserve d'interpreta-
tion would these particular provisions of the law be compatible with 
the Constitution.193 The Conseil upheld the constitutionality of the 
law but then used a reserve d'interpretation (specifically an injunction 
or directive), to tell the administrative authorities how the law must 
be applied. The Conseil applied the same injunction to the law on 
identity checks reviewed in the Security and Liberty decision. 194 But 
in that decision, the proposed law called for identity checks only in 
situations where there was a threat to the public order, and, more 
specifically, to the security of persons or property. 195 A law passed in 
June, 1983 imposed an immediacy requirement on the threat to 
public order and safety required for the execution of preventive 
186Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
187 [d. 
188 [d. 
189 See Decision of Jan. 9, 1990, Con. const., 1990 ].0.465. 
190 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
191 [d. 
192 [d. 
193 [d. 
194 Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981.J.0. 312. 
195 [d. 
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police identity checks.196 In 1986, however, a law proposing to re-
move the immediacy requirementl97 from the text of the law was 
referred to the Conseil for review. 198 The Conseil found the pro-
posed law to be compatible with the Constitution because it was still 
subject to the procedural safeguards set out in the previous Security 
and Liberty decision. 199 
As in the Security and Liberty decision and the recent Immigration 
and Asylum decision, the Conseil used the injunction technique by 
directing the judicial authorities to ensure respect for legislative 
rules and guarantees as well as for the competent courts to censure 
and punish.20o In both the Security and Liberty decision and the 
August 26, 1986 decision, the Conseil balanced the interests of the 
individual in his or her freedom to act against the interests of law 
enforcement in preserving public safety and order.201 In both in-
stances, the Conseil concluded that the interest in individual liberty 
was outweighed by the need to curb threats to public order.202 In the 
Immigration and Asylum decision, however, the law proposes that the 
police may perform random identity checks203 regardless of whether 
there is a threat to public order. The Conseil rejected the argument 
that the provision violated the principle of equality, stating that 
foreigners and French nationals are placed in different situations, 
and therefore, may be treated differently under the law.204 By up-
holding this law, the Conseil increased the powers of the police in 
relation to individuals without providing additional justification for 
that increase. It simply upheld the new law using the same reserve 
d'interpretation that it had directed in both prior decisions.205 
196Vroom, supra note 6, at 294 n.l54. 
197Id. at 294. 
198 Decision of Aug. 26, 1986, Con. const., 1986 ].0. 10438, 10439. 
199Id. Vroom notes that the modified provision was criticized as being overly vague, giving 
police unrestricted authority to perform identity checks and offering inadequate protection 
of the constitutional right of freedom of movement. Vroom, supra note 6, at 295. 
200 Decision of Aug. 26, 1986, Con. const., 1986 ].0. 10439. 
201 Vroom, supra note 6, at 294-95. 
202Id. 
203 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
204Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-46. 
205 Vroom, supra note 6, at 294. A commentator's perspective on the earlier decisions is 
perhaps even more poignant in regard to the Immigration and Asylum decision: "the bill might 
as well have said that identity checks are permitted in all circumstances." Id. at 295 n.160. 
Since the 1993 decision, Charles Pasqua has used the law permitting identity checks to combat 
the Algerian crisis of August 1994 (five French nationals were killed at a diplomatic compound 
in Algeria) by calling for French police forces to check the identities of those suspected of 
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E. Individual Liberties 
1. Administrative Detention 
The Pasqua Bill included several provisions that infringed upon 
individual liberties, including the duration of administrative deten-
tion.206 During the time necessary for arranging their departure, 
foreigners who are awaiting expulsion from French territory can be 
detained in a nonpenal institution prior to judicial approva1.207 This 
detention lasts for a period of six days, but can be extended for a 
period of twenty-four hours if the foreigner does not have the 
proper documents necessary for expulsion and if so ordered by a 
magistrate. 208 The new law proposed that this detention period be 
extended by seventy-two hours upon the order of the president of 
the tribunal de grande instance (court of first instance) or a magistrate 
designated by the tribunal's president.209 
The authors of the referral argued that this provision deprived 
the foreigner of constitutional guarantees of individual liberty.210 
The Conseil responded that the legislature is at liberty to modifY 
detention measures on the condition that it does not deprive the 
foreigner of any constitutional guarantees.2l1 The Conseil found that 
in the absence of an absolute emergency or serious threat to the 
public order, the extension, although subject to judicial scrutiny, 
violated the principle of individual liberty guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.212 It is important to point out that the Conseil had already 
ruled on this issue in its Entry and Stay of Foreigners decision of 
being linked to Islamic terrorists. Suzanne Lowry, Focus Purge on Islam: Pasqua Rides a Wave 
of Fear, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 20, Aug. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
206 Communique, supra note 84. 
207 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11728; Brehier, supra note 67, at 7. 
208 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11728; Brehier, supra note 67, at 7. 
209 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. Under the present law, a foreigner who 
has not produced the proper travel documents is let free after the maximum seven-day 
detention period (six days and the additional 24-hour extension). Philippe Bernard, Apres la 
"censure" du Conseil constitutionnel le nouveau projet de loi Pasqua maintient les possibilites de 
controle des manages mixtes (After the Conseil Constitutionnel's censure, the Pasqua Bill project 
maintains the possibility of stopping mixed marnages), LE MONDE, Sept. 24, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, World Library, Monde File. Because the foreigner purposely makes the documents 
disappear, his identity must be verified by the consulate of his native country. Id. In 15% of 
the cases this process takes more than the permitted seven days. Id. 
2JODecision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11728. 
211 Id. 
212Id. 
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September 3, 1986.213 In that decision, the Conseil upheld an 
amendment to the law which would allow the expulsion of a foreign-
er who was considered a threat to the public order.214 The Conseil 
reasoned that application of the provision constituted proper use of 
legislative prerogative.215 But the Conseil struck down the part of the 
amendment which called for a three-day extension of the detention 
period.216 In doing so, the Conseil declared (using similar language 
to that used in the instant decision) that such an extension, even if 
under judicial control, could not be prolonged absent an extreme 
emergency, or a particularly serious threat to the public order, with-
out infringing upon the constitutional principle of individual lib-
erty.217 The Immigration and Asylum decision represents the second 
time the Conseil has annulled a provision seeking to extend the 
period of detention from twenty-four hours to seventy-two hours. 
2. Judicial Detention 
In addition to the provision regarding administrative detention, 
a second provision relating to judicial detention was also annulled 
by the Conseil,218 The judicial detention provision sought to create 
a three month period of detention for those foreigners who refused 
to present the appropriate travel documents in order to prevent 
their expulsion from France.219 According to an ordonnance (French 
law) dated November 2, 1945, a foreigner who attempts to block 
expulsion by refusing to present the necessary documents is guilty 
of an offense and can be convicted and sentenced to a prison 
term.220 The proposed law would allow the tribunal to postpone the 
prison term and place the foreigner in administrative detention for 
up to three months.221 
The authors of the referral argued that the provisions allow the 
judiciary to act in furtherance of police conduct to deprive individu-
213 Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., 1986].0. 10790, 10792. 
214 Id. at 10791. 
215Id. at 10792. 
216Id. 
217Id. 
218 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. Administrative detention occurs 
where time is needed to gather the appropriate documents for an alien's departure. See 
generally id.Judicial detention, on the other hand, occurs where the detainee has committed 
some sort of offense and is awaiting expulsion. See generally id. 
219 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
220Id. 
221Id. 
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als of the constitutional guarantee of individual liberty, as well as the 
principles found in Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration.222 As the 
Declaration states: 'The law may only create penalties that are strictly 
and evidently necessary. No one may be punished except according 
to a law passed and promulgated prior to the offense, and lawfully 
applied. "223 
The Conseil responded that judicial detention is not a criminal 
sentence and that the proposed measure would result in depriving 
a person completely of liberty during a determined period.224 The 
Conseil referred to Article 66 of the Constitution, quoting: "No one 
may be detained arbitrarily. The judiciary, the guardian of individual 
liberty, ensures respect for this principle in circumstances provided 
for by law. "225 The Conseil concluded that the provision did not 
satisfy the guarantees of individual liberty and was therefore con-
trary to the Constitution.226 
Here, as with the provision relating to administrative detention, 
the Conseil again did not attempt to uphold the law and impose 
conditions through a reserve d'interpretation, but instead annulled 
the law. Because detention is such an extreme restraint on personal 
freedom, it requires a higher degree of justification in order to 
uphold its validity.227 Although the Conseil increased detention pow-
ers in the Security and Liberty decision of 1981, it resisted doing so 
in its August, 1993 decision.228 In the 1981 decision, the Conseil 
allowed increased detention powers by requiring sufficient inquiry 
before detention or before the authorization of its extension.229 This 
directive or injunction imposed by the Conseil required a judge to 
authorize any extension of the twenty-four hour detention period.230 
The Conseil imposed greater safeguards for the protection of 
individual liberty231 in the Immigration Law decision of January 9, 
222 [d. 
223 Declaration of 1789, supra note 141, art. 8. 
224 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
225ld. 
226 [d. 
227 BELL, supra note 5, at 143. 
228 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722. 
229 See Decision of January 19-20,1981, Con. const., 1981].0. 310. 
230 [d. In this case a 24-hour detention period could only be extended to 72 hours where 
the detainee was under investigation for committing an offense involving an attack on a 
person or a robbery. See BELL, supra note 5, at 143. The Conseil said the decision had to be 
made by a judge because article 66 of the Constitution makes the judiciary the guardian of 
civil liberties. [d. 
231 BELL, supra note 5, at 143. 
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1980.232 In that decision, the Conseil reviewed a law designed to 
prevent illegal immigration and control the entry and stay of for-
eigners.233 The Conseil upheld the provisions of the law that gave 
the authorities the power to detain illegal immigrants who were 
refused entry into France.234 This restriction on individual liberty was 
justifiable because the detention was for a limited period and its 
extension could be authorized only by the President of the tribunal 
de grande instance. 235 Further justification for the provision was pro-
vided by the Conseil in the form of an addition (method of reserve 
d'interpretation) providing that the detainee was entitled to seek the 
assistance of an interpreter, a doctor, and counsel,236 The Conseil 
did, however, strike down one provision whereby a foreigner could 
be detained for seven days before ajudge intervened.237 The Conseil 
held that individual liberty could not be considered to be protected 
unless a judge intervened within the shortest possible period of 
time.238 This decision marks the first time the Conseil relied directly 
on Article 66 of the Constitution.239 
It is clear from these decisions that the Constitution applies to 
aliens awaiting expulsion. The Conseil recognized the need to limit 
the legislature's right to balance individual liberties against the need 
for public order.240 The Conseil determined that detention is a 
severe restriction on individual liberty that infringes upon basic 
human rights to which both French nationals and foreigners are 
entitled.241 Yet, despite its insistence that the legislature respect the 
232 Decision of Jan. 9,1980, Con. const., 1980].0. 85. 
233 See id. 
234Id. 
235Id. 
236 !d. 
237 Decision of Jan. 9,1980, Con. const., 1980].0. 85. 
238Id. 
239Vroom, supra note 6, at 281. 
240 See Guendelsberger, supra note 11, at 684. It is interesting to note that the United States 
Supreme Court has found that the United States Constitution is inapplicable to aliens who 
are detained at the border. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 
(1953). United States immigration law allows a foreigner awaiting expulsion to be detained 
up to six months. 8 U.S.C. § l252(c). Mter 1981 and the flood of Cuban and Haitian refugees, 
the U.S. began detaining foreigners for indefinite periods of time. Guendelsberger, supra note 
11, at 683. The American courts defer to the legislature in its role as protector of national 
sovereignty, while the Conseil has not hesitated to ensure that the legislature properly balances 
the needs of government against the Constitutional right to individual liberty. See id. at 683-84. 
241 BELL, supra note 5, at 144. Bell suggests that this basic human right extends to terrorists 
as well. Id. In its decision of September 3, 1986 relating to terrorism law, the Conseil relied 
on article 66 of the Constitution when it considered the extension of the detention period in 
terrorist cases. Id. 
1995] IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM DECISION 295 
constitutional principle of individual liberty, the Conseil has also 
allowed Parliament broad discretion to regulate the right to individ-
ual liberty.242 In the September 1986 Entry and Stay of Foreigners 
decision, the Conseil stated that it was "up to the legislature to 
determine, in the public interest, the conditions on the exercise of 
liberty. "243 
3. Control of Marriages of Convenience 
Like detention, marriages of convenience are fertile ground for 
interpretive doctrine. To counteract these manages blanes, or mar-
riages of convenience, the Pasqua Bill proposed a modification244 to 
the French Civil Code.245 This modification provided that a mayor, 
in response to serious indications raising suspicion that a marriage 
was arranged solely for a foreigner to obtain citizenship, could refer 
the matter to the Proeureur de la Ripubliquewho could then postpone 
the wedding for a period of three months.246 The authors of the 
referral opposing this modification argued that this Article created 
a sanction manifestly disproportionate in relation to its implica-
tions. 247 In addition, the opposition criticized the absence of a pro-
vision giving the right to appeal a decision to postpone the mar-
riage.24s The opposition also asserted that the provision represented 
an attack on the freedom and liberty of marriage and the right to 
lead a private life.249 
The Conseil responded to these arguments by annulling the pro-
vision on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution.25o The 
Conseil declared that the terms of the provision violated the princi-
ple of the liberty of marriage, which is a component of individual 
liberty.251 The provisions stating that the mayor was obligated to refer 
a suspected marriage of convenience to the Proeureur, that the 
marriage could be postponed up to three months, and that there 
242 Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., 1986 ].0. 10791. 
243Id. 
244 Communique, supra note 84. 
245 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 175. 
246 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
247Id. 
248Id. 
249Id. 
250Id. 
251 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
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was no right to appeal the decision of the Procureur, were particularly 
problematic in the opinion of the Conseil.252 
F. Political Asylum 
Another area in which the Conseil displayed strict adherence to 
constitutional principles relates to the highly controversial issue of 
political asylum. In the beginning of its opinion regarding the pro-
posed restriction on political asylum in France, the Conseil pre-
sented the principles that should guide French asylum policy.253 
First, the Conseil referred to the fourth paragraph of the Preamble 
to the 1946 Constitution.254 The Preamble states: "Any person per-
secuted for his activities on behalf of freedom has the right of asylum 
in the territories of the Republic. "255 Mter citing the Preamble, the 
Conseil added that if certain guarantees attached to the right to 
asylum were anticipated by international conventions adopted by 
French national law, it was the legislature's responsibility to carry 
out these guarantees of constitutional value.256 The Conseil went on 
to say that asylum is a fundamental right and the exercise of that 
right by foreigners must be recognized.257 The Conseil concluded 
that the law can only regulate the conditions on asylum by making 
it more effective or by reconciling it with other constitutional rules 
or principles.258 The Conseil focused on several provisions of the 
proposed legislation, such as residence permits and the refusal to 
examine an application for asylum.259 
1. Titre de 5ejour (Residence Permit) 
The provision introduced by the Pasqua Bill clarifies the condi-
tions under which an asylum-seeker may be refused admission into 
France.26o The law proposes that if a refusal is not opposed by the 
applicant, a titre de sijour will be delivered to the applicant, but if 
necessary, may be taken away or not be renewed. 261 The authors of 
252 [d. 
253 [d. at II 727 . 
254 [d. 
255FR. CON ST. of 1946, pmbl., para. 4. 
256 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993].0.1I727. 
257 [d. 
258 [d. 
259 [d. 
260 [d. 
261 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. II 727. (Note that the circumstances 
are not defined in the decision.) 
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the referral argue that the provision infringes upon the legal guar-
antees provided for by the constitutional right to asylum.262 
The Conseil responded that respect for the right to asylum means 
that authorization to stay temporarily on French territory, during 
the time necessary to make a decision regarding the individual's 
asylum status, must be given to any foreigner claiming the right to 
asylum.263 During this time, the foreigner may effectively exercise his 
droits de la difense,264 or defensive rights, provided for in Article 66 
of the Constitution.265 The Conseil's decision effectively reads the 
new provisions introduced by the Pasqua Bill as infringements upon 
the allocation of power to the judiciary as the guardian of individual 
liberty against executive interference. 
2. Compatibility with International Conventions 
Another even more controversial provision of the law proposes 
that, in accordance with the stipulations of international conven-
tions, France may refuse to examine the asylum application of a 
foreigner whose case has already been determined by another EU 
Member State.266 The opposition argues that by permitting the re-
fusal of asylum in accordance with the stipulations of the Schengen 
and Dublin Conventions, the provision violates the fourth para-
graph of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, which does not 
authorize such a severe restriction.267 
The Schengen Agreement and Convention and the Dublin Con-
vention are the most recent and the most important multilateral 
measures regarding asylum.268 On June 14, 1985, Germany, France, 
and the Benelux countries concluded the Schengen Agreement, 
and since then have been joined by Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece.269 The Dublin Convention prescribes the procedure for ex-
amination of asylum claims and has been signed by all of the mem-
262Id. 
263Id. 
264FR. CONST. art. 66. Note that Article 66 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o one may 
be detained arbitrarily, and that [t]he judiciary, the guardian of individual liberty, ensures 
respect for this principle in circumstances provided for by law." Id. 
265Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11727. 
266Id. (referring to the Schengen Agreement). 
267Id. 
268 See Daniel Kanstroom, The Shining City and the Fortress: Reflections on the "Euro-solution" 
to the German Immigration Dilemma, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 201, 214 (1993). 
269 Id. Italy joined in December 1990, and Portugal and Spain in 1991. Id. Greece was 
granted observer status in June 1991. Id. Thus, to date, there are nine members making up 
the Schengen Group. Id. 
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bers of the Schengen Group.270 The aims of the Schengen Agree-
ment and the Dublin Convention271 are to eliminate all border 
controls among EU Member States in order to ensure the free 
movement of goods and EU nationals, and most importantly, to 
control non-EU immigration.272 Although immigration policy under 
the Schengen Agreement remains under the control of the Member 
States themselves,273 asylum policy is not exclusively a matter of 
national sovereignty, and may be qualified by agreement among the 
group members.274 The Convention makes clear that no Member 
State is required to authorize every applicant for asylum to enter or 
to remain within the national territory.275 Furthermore, despite its 
general commitment to the Geneva Convention276 and New York 
Protocol,277 the Schengen Agreement gives Member States the 
authority to "refuse entry or expel any applicant for asylum to a third 
State on the basis of its national provisions and in accordance with 
its international commitments."278 
270 Kanstroom, supra note 268, at 218. 
271 The European Community Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examin-
ing Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of Member States of the European Communities, 
June 15, 1990,30 LL.M. 425 [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
272 See Kanstroom, supra note 268, at 214-15. 
273 See id. at 216. 
274Id. at 217. 
275Schengen Agreement, supra note 88, tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(2). 
276 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 V.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Title II, chapter 7, article 28 of the Schengen Agreement 
reaffirms the commitment of the Member States to the Geneva Convention. See Kanstroom, 
supra note 268, at 216. 
277New York Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 V.N.T.S. 267, 6 LL.M. 78 (1967). The Geneva 
Convention defined a refugee as a person who: "As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted ... is outside his country 
of nationality .... " Geneva Convention, supra note 276. The New York Protocol responded 
to the emergence of new refugee situations by making the Convention applicable to refugees 
regardless of the dateline. OFFICE OF THE VNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFu-
GEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS at 4, 
V.N. Doc. (1979). 
278 Schengen Agreement, supra note 88, tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(2). This provision seems to cast 
doubt on the nonrefoulement provisions of article 33 of the Geneva Convention, which provides 
that no state shall expel an asylum-seeker to the country where he or she has a fear of 
persecution, unless there is a reasonable belief that the individual presents a danger to the 
state in which he or she is seeking asylum. Geneva Convention, supra note 276, art. 33. Article 
33 provides: 
(1) No contracting State shall expel or return ("rtjoule7") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. 
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The Dublin Convention contains provisions ensuring that only 
one Member State will make an asylum decision.279 The main factors 
determining which government should be responsible for a decision 
include which Member State has granted the applicant a visa and 
whether the applicant resides in the territory of a particular Member 
State.280 Both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention 
proclaim that Member States may rely upon each other's asylum 
decisions in order to achieve the important goal of avoiding multiple 
asylum applications.28! The EU Commission reported that this reli-
ance on another Member State's decision means that no Member 
State could fall back upon a reservation to its own national law in 
this regard.282 Thus, for example, an asylum applicant whose appli-
cation was denied by Germany could not then make a constitutional 
claim under French law for a reconsideration of his asylum applica-
tion.283 
The Conseil, in its examination of the new provisions, first noted 
that the proposed national law could not be compatible with the 
Constitution unless it was consistent with the provisions of the Ge-
neva Convention.284 The superior authority of the Geneva Conven-
tion over national law is derived from Article 55 of the Constitu-
tion.285 This conflict called into question the tension between the 
new law, which provides that France can refuse to consider an 
application for asylum that has been rejected by another Member 
State, and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, as well as France's 
own liberal asylum policy enshrined in the Preamble to the 1946 
Id. 
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however. be claimed by a refugee 
when there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
279 Dublin Convention, supra note 271, art. 3 (2). 
280 See Kanstroom, supra note 268, at 218 (citing Convention arts. 4-8). 
281/d. at 218, 221. 
282Id. at 221 (citing Report of the European Commission on Immigration Law, PARL. EUR. 
Doc. (SEC 1857) 5 (1991)). 
283Id. at 221. The principle that States can legitimately rely upon each other's asylum 
decisions forces each State to question the asylum procedures of the other States. See id. at 
219. The problem arises when one State's asylum policy is extremely liberal in comparison to 
the other States' policies, because refugees will certainly seek asylum where it is most easily 
gran ted. See id. 
284 Decision of Aug. 13, 1994, Con. const., 1993].0. 11727. 
285Id. Article 55 of the Constitution provides: "From their publication, duly ratified or 
approved treaties or agreements have a higher authority than laws, subject, for each treaty or 
agreement, to its implementation by the other party." FR. CaNST. art. 55. 
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Constitution.286 The Conseil settled this problem by stating that the 
determination of another Member State responsible for deciding an 
asylum case in accordance with an international convention is ac-
ceptable in France only if the convention reserves the right of 
France to also review the case in light of the Preamble.287 The 
Conseil emphasized in the form of an injunction that this obligation 
had to be assured by the legislature, and that only under this strict 
reserve d'interpretation would the provision be deemed compatible 
with the Constitution.288 The Conseil chose not to refer to Article 54 
of the Constitution,289 which states that if, upon proper referral, the 
Conseil determines that the terms of an international treaty are 
contrary to the Constitution, then there must be an amendment to 
the Constitution in order for the treaty to be ratified. 
IV. REACTION TO THE DECISION OF AUGUST 13,1993 
A. Correction oj the Censured Provisions 
Despite the apparent supreme authority of the Conseil, a new 
Government project to convert the censured provisions has suc-
ceeded in evading the Conseil's intent. The mechanism for this 
evasion is the point-by-point responses to the censured provisions, 
which superficially address the problems and thus allow the legisla-
tion to move forward without addressing the larger concerns regard-
ing human rights implicit in the Conseil's opinion. Contrary to 
Fran~ois Leotard's (past Minister of Culture) criticism that "[t]he 
legislator legislates in the shadow cast by the Constitutional Coun-
cil, "290 it seems more accurate to say that the legislature dances 
around the shadow cast by the Conseil. In its August 1993 decision, 
the Conseil annulled certain provisions of the Pasqua Bill as con-
286 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
287 [d. at 11728. 
288 [d. 
289 Article 54 of the Constitution provides: 
If, on a reference from the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or the 
President of either chamber, or 60 deputies or senators, the Conseil Constitutionnel 
declares that an international agreement includes a clause contrary to the Constitu-
tion, authorization to ratifY or approve it may only be given after a revision of the 
Constitution. 
FR. CONST. art. 54. 
290 STONE, supra note 18, at 119 (quoting Franl:ois Leotard, Minister of Culture). 
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trary to the Constitution.291 Yet, by employing its technique of 
reserves d'interpretation to particular provisions of the Pasqua Bill, the 
Conseil explicitly identified those sections of the provisions that 
necessitated such a ruling.292 Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, the 
author of the laws, noted the express observations and reworked the 
problematic provisions in accordance with the formulations pre-
sented by the Conseil.293 Thus, the Minister viewed the Conseil's 
decision as a reserve d'interpretation, and the new versions of the 
provisions are written so as to apply the law according to that inter-
pretation. The text revisions only applied to those provisions 
deemed to violate such principles of individual liberty as adminis-
trative detention, judicial detention, and marriages of conven-
ience.294 These revisions were adopted into law in early 1994 without 
being referred to the Conseil for a second review.295 
1. Administrative Detention 
The censured law relating to administrative detention called for 
an extension of the detention period from seven to ten days.296 In 
its ruling the Conseil declared that, absent an absolute urgency and 
serious threat to the public order, such an extension infringed upon 
a foreigner's individual rights.297 The newly revised law reintroduces 
the possibility of a seventy-two hour extension when the foreigner 
has not presented the proper documents to the administrative 
authorities, and when the circumstances show that the supplemen-
tary time period is for the sole purpose of obtaining that docu-
ment.298 The new text does not abandon the essential seventy-two 
hour extension of the original Pasqua law. Rather, it retains the 
extension but mandates that such extension be for the sole purpose 
of obtaining the appropriate documents. 299 In summary, the new law 
extends a seventy-two hour extension to two situations, where there 
is an absolute emergency or threat to public order, and where the 
necessary travel documents are unavailable.30o The latter situation 
291 See generally Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11722. 
292 See id. 
293Bernard, supra note 209. 
294 [d. 
295 ].C.P. No.4, Jan. 26, 1994 (Actualites sec.). 
296Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11728. 
297 [d. 
298].C.P.,Jan. 26, 1994, supra note 295. 
299 [d. 
300 [d. 
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does not seem to warrant the high degree of intrusion constituted 
by a seventy-two hour extension. Although in theory the revised law 
conforms to the Conseil's prescriptions, in practice it presents a 
serious threat to a detainee's individual liberty. 
2. Judicial Detention 
In the case of judicial detention, the Conseil annulled the provi-
sion of the Pasqua Bill requiring a three-month period of detention 
for a foreigner who refused to present the proper travel documents 
in order to prevent his expulsion from the Republic. 301 The Conseil 
reasoned that judicial detention was not a criminal sentence, but 
rather a complete deprivation of the foreigner's individual liberty. 302 
According to the revised text, the foreigner cannot be placed in 
judicial detention unless he is more than sixteen years of age.303 In 
addition, the detainee can request the assistance of an interpreter, 
a doctor, or an attorney.304 The detainee may communicate with the 
outside world, receive visits, and even obtain the authorization to 
leave the nonpenal institution without an escort.305 Finally, the de-
tainee may appeal detention within ten days of the decision to 
detain.306 The revised provision maintains the essential element of 
the length of the period, but at the same time creates additional 
guarantees for the detainee in order to address the Conseil's con-
cerns for the preservation of individual liberty. It is important to 
recall that this method of imposing greater safeguards for the pro-
tection of individual liberty, in an effort to justify greater intrusions 
on that liberty, was criticized by the Conseil itself, through a strict 
reserve d'interpretation, in the Immigration Law decision. In that de-
cision, the Conseil upheld a law calling for the detention of illegal 
immigrants, but only under the strict reservation that the detainee 
be entitled to seek the assistance of an interpreter, a doctor, or legal 
counseP07 Here, the legislative revision of the law, rather than the 
Conseil by its decision, provides the addition to the provision in 
order to make it constitutionap08 Once again the revision does not 
301 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
302 [d. 
303Bernard, supra note 209;].C.P., Jan. 26, 1994, supra note 295. 
304].C.P., Jan. 26, 1994, supra note 295. 
305 [d. 
306 [d. 
307 Decision of Jan. 9, 1980, Con. canst., 1980].0. 85. 
308 Stone refers to this concept as a technique employed by the legislator to approve the 
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address the issue of the actual length of detention, which in an 
earlier case was considered to infringe upon such individual liberties 
as the right to privacy and the right to freedom of movement.30g 
3. Marriages of Convenience 
With regard to marriages of convenience, the Conseil censured 
the provision mandating a mayor who suspects a marriage of con-
venience to refer the matter to the Procureur of the Republic to 
postpone the marriage for a period of up to three months. 310 The 
Conseil struck down the provision, pointing out that the length of 
the postponement and the absence of a right to appeal the Pro-
cureur's decision infringed upon the liberty of marriage, a compo-
nent of individualliberty.311 The revision in the new law refines the 
text by modifYing those provisions specifically identified by the Con-
seil in its decision.312 First, the mayor's decision to refer a matter to 
the Procureur is optional, not obligatory.313 Secondly, the postpone-
ment period is reduced from three months to one month.314 Finally, 
the Procureur must inform the concerned parties of the decision, 
and the parties, even if they are minors, are entitled to contest the 
decision before the President of the tribunal de grande instance, as 
well as appeal that decision.3!5 In this area, the new law again man-
ages to hold on to the essential portion of the proposed law, the 
power of the mayor and Procureur to stop marriages of convenience, 
but justifies this intrusion upon individual liberty by providing cer-
tain additional rights to those whose rights are being infringed.316 
B. The Need to Amend the Constitution 
The Conseil's decision to strike down the Pasqua Bill provisions 
restricting France's asylum policy in accordance with the Schengen 
Agreement sparked the Interior Minister's resolution to seek an 
constitutionality of a censured law, by remarking that "[g]overnments eschew imaginative 
reworkings of once-censured legislation in corrective revision processes, often choosing in-
stead to mechanically copy the exact terms of Council decisions into beleaguered legislation." 
STONE, supra note 18, at 135. 
309 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 280. 
310 Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11729. 
3ll Id. 
312].C.P.,Jan. 26, 1994, supra note 295. 
313Id. 
314Id. 
315Id. 
316 See id. 
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amendment to the conflicting portion of the Constitution.317 The 
Interior Minister demanded the advice of the Conseil d'Etat, 
France's highest administrative court, about whether the Pasqua Bill 
provision removing France's obligation to examine an asylum re-
quest previously submitted to another member of the Schengen 
Group was constitutionaP18 On September 23, 1993, the Conseil 
d'Etat responded by advising that a constitutional amendment 
would be necessary to remove the obligation for France to examine 
a request for asylum that was previously turned down by another 
Member State.319 According to the Conseil d'Etat, such a revision 
was essential for France's ratification of the Schengen Agreement. 320 
317 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 J.O. 11727; John Ridding, France May 
Alter Asylum Controls, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws 
File. The Interior Minister warned that without the measure, France would be flooded with 
asylum-seekers who were refused entry into other Member States. Ridding, supra. The majority 
of the EU Member States participating in the Schengen Agreement agreed to delay its 
implementation for two months, pushing back the date to February 1, 1994, in order to give 
France time to amend its Constitution. Paul Taylor, EC Ministers Agree Feb. 1 Deadline for Open 
Borders, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., Oct. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Curnws File; Nelson Graves, Balladur Wants Harmony with Mitterand on Immigration, 
REUTERS, SEPT. 2, 1993, available in Westlaw, INT-News Database. 
318J.C.P., No. 40, Oct. 6, 1993 (Actualites sec.). The Conseil d'Etat acts as an advisor to the 
government, deciding whether provisions, as drafted, are constitutional or not. BELL, supra 
note 5, at 53. 
319)Ves Gautier, Les Accords de Schengen et le droit d'asile d l'epreuve du dtibat constitutionnel 
(The Schengen Agreement and the right to asylum put to the test of constitutional debate), ED. 
TECHNIQUES, EUROPE 1, Dec. 1993 (on file with the B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv.). The Conseil 
d'Etat is France's highest administrative court and sits within the executive branch of the 
government. MERRYMAN, supra note 28, at 88. It acts as advisor to the government with regard 
to the constitutionality of bills. BELL, supra note 5, at 53. 
320 Balladur Seeks to Allay Asylum Fears, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Article 89 of the Constitution describes the amendment 
process that the Conseil d'Etat would follow and reads as follows: 
The initiative for revision of the Constitution belongs concurrently to the President 
of the Republic on the proposal of the Prime Minister and to members of Parliament. 
The bill for revision must be passed by the two chambers in identical terms. The 
revision becomes definitive after it has been approved by referendum. 
Nevertheless, the revision bill is not submitted to a referendum when the President 
of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in Congress; in this 
case, the revision bill is only approved if it obtains a majority of three-fifths of the 
votes cast. The office of the Congress is that of the National Assembly. 
No procedure for revision may be undertaken or pursued when it would infringe 
the integrity of [national] territory. 
The republican form of government may not be the subject of the revision. 
FR. CONST. tit. 15, art. 89. 
In its response to Pasqua's demand, the Conseil d'Etat expressly stated that the provisions 
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In light of the Conseil d'Etat's opinion, Socialist President Mitter-
and and Conservative Prime Minister Balladur agreed to a proposed 
amendment to the Constitution.321 This proposed amendment was 
adopted by the National Assembly and the Senate on November 19, 
1993.322 The amendment declares that France may, but is not obli-
gated to, consider asylum requests from foreigners who have already 
been turned down by the signatory countries of the Schengen 
Agreement.323 The amendment does not, however, make clear what 
authority will determine if an asylum case will be reviewed, what 
criteria will be required, or the procedure that will be followed. 324 
Any new legislation passed after approval of the constitutional 
amendment and designed for its implementation, however, risks 
being subject to the scrutiny of the Conseil via a second referraP25 
This is not the first time that the Conseil ruled on the constitu-
tionality of an international treaty. The Conseil's decision regarding 
the Maastricht Treaty resulted in an amendment to the Constitution 
in order to allow implementation of the Treaty.326 When the Maas-
tricht agreements were being signed in December 1991 and Febru-
of the Pasqua Bill would not allow France to apply article 29, paragraph 4 of the Schengen 
Agreement. j.c.P., Oct. 6, 1993, supra note 318. Paragraph 4 provides: 
Notwithstanding paragraph 3 [that regardless of the Contracting Party who receives 
an asylum application, only one Contracting Party is responsible for assessing the 
application] every Contracting Party shall retain the right, for special reasons con-
cerning national law in particular, to process an application for asylum even if under 
this Convention the responsibility for doing so is that of another Contracting Party. 
Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 88, art. 29(4). 
321 French Cabinet Approves Compromise on Asylum, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., Oct. 20, 
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
322French Congress votes constitutional change on political asylum, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 
19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
323D.S.L., 1993, No.44, at 552. This amendment is added to the Constitution under Title 
VI: Treaties and International Agreements, as article 53--1. Id. The amendment represents a 
compromise between the right-wing of the government led by Prime Minister Balladur, and 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, and the Socialist President Mitterand, who opposed limiting 
the asylum prerogative. Government to reform constitution on political asylum, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Oct. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
324 Olivier Biffaud & Thierry Brehier, Ne d'un Compromis Entre l'Elysee et Matignon le Texte 
sur le Droit d'Asile est une Victoire pour M. Pasqua (A Compromise Reached on the Asylum Laws 
is a Victory for Mr. Pasqua), LE MONDE, Oct. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Monde File. The authors note that Pasqua announced that he will introduce new legislation 
after the approval of the constitutional amendment. Id. They warn that this may lead to 
draconian restrictions subsequent to the implementation of the amendment. Id. 
325 STONE, supra note 18, at 120. 
326 Sophie Boyron, The Conseil Constitutionnel and the European Union, 1993 PUB. L. 30, 31 
(Spring). 
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ary 1992, the President of the Republic, under Article 54 of the 
Constitution,327 sent the Treaty to the Conseil for review.328 In its 
decision of April 9, 1992, the Conseil ruled that three provisions of 
the treaty violated the concept of national sovereignty enshrined in 
the French Constitution, and thus an amendment to the Constitu-
tion was necessary in order to ratify the treaty.329 The resulting 
amendment created Title XIV of the Constitution, entitled "Euro-
pean Communities and European Union."33o 
France is not the first Member State that needed to amend its 
Constitution in order to ratify the Schengen Agreement. 331 For ex-
ample, Germany's ratification of the Schengen Agreement posed 
similar challenges to its Basic Law (Constitution), which contains an 
extremely liberal asylum policy vis a vis the other Member States.332 
The provision of the Schengen Agreement stating that a Member 
State is not bound to authorize every applicant for asylum to enter 
or remain within its territory333 directly contradicts Germany's con-
stitutionally required right of entry and right to judicial review. 334 The 
German government argued that a constitutional amendment was 
necessary in order to prevent a flood of asylum-seekers who had 
been denied entry elsewhere.335 Professor Daniel Kanstroom asserts, 
in his discussion of these developments in German asylum policy, 
that: "[o]n the functional level, the immediate impact of Schengen 
and Maastricht on the German immigration and asylum dilemma is 
unlikely to be as dramatic as that of the amendment to the Basic 
Law."336 This result is due to the fact that Germany's constitutional 
327FR. CONST. art. 54. 
328Boyron, supra note 326, at 31. 
329Id. at 32. 
330 FR. CON ST. tit. 14; see also Boyron, supra note 326, at 36. It is interesting to note that the 
Conseil d'Etat suggested that the new amendment relating to the Schengen Agreement be 
included in Title 14 of the Constitution, but the government did not accept this proposal, 
instead placing the amendment in Title VI, "Treaties and International Agreements." Thierry 
Brehier, La rejorme du droit d'asile: M. Balladur souhaite l'adoption rapide de la r:evision 
constitutionnelle, LE MONDE, Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Monde File. 
331 See Kanstroom, supra note 268, at 219-20 n.137 (describing Germany's constitutional 
amendmen t relating to Schengen). 
332Id. at 219-20 & n.l37. 
333 Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 88, tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(2). 
334 Kanstroom, supra note 268, at 216--17 (Note that such rights are not constitutionally 
protected in France). 
335Id. at 219-21. The author notes that the government's fears are questionable in light of 
the fact that only 10-15% of the asylum-seekers in other Schengen countries travel to Ger-
many. Id. at 221 n.138. This statistic casts doubt on the fears of the French government as 
well. 
336Id. at 241. 
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amendment has been passed and its effects are forthcoming, 
whereas the Schengen Agreement has not yet come into effect as 
law. It is ironic that countries such as Germany, and now France, are 
scrambling to avoid the ramifications of an agreement that has not 
yet become binding. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM DECISION 
A. Significance of the Revisions and the Gouvernement des Juges 
The significance of the revisions discussed in Part IV, Section A337 
is the immediate impact of the Conseil's decision on the legisla-
ture. 338 One commentator noted that "referrals to [the Conseil] are 
extraordinarily efficacious weapons in the hands of the opposi-
tion. "339 He attributes this to the fact that referral of a bill to the 
Conseil automatically suspends its promulgation until the Conseil 
reaches its decision. 340 Furthermore, a law that is deemed unconsti-
tutional cannot be promulgated.341 This result forces the legislature 
to begin the legislative process again, keeping in mind the possibility 
of a second referraP42 Stone refers to this process as "corrective 
revision," and argues that it implicates the Conseil as a policy-maker, 
telling the legislature how it should legislate in order to avoid the 
invalidation of laws,343 rather than as a constitutional court, insisting 
that both the legislature and the Government honor constitutional 
principles. But without this check on the branches of government, 
laws would be "the expression of the Government's will as approved 
by a political majority."344 For constitutional review to be effective, 
the Conseil must be able to impose its will on the other institu-
tions.345 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 291-316. 
338 It is important to note that Interior Minister Pasqua criticized the Conseil for "preventing 
the government from applying its politics" and referred to the revised texts as "corrections" 
made in consideration of the Conseil's "observations." See Thomas Ferenczi, Un nouveau projet 
corrigeant certaines des dispositions censurees sera presente au Parlement (A new project correcting 
certain censured provisions will be presented to Parliament), LE MONDE, Sept. 19-20, 1993, at 11. 
The reporter here refers to the newly revised measures as "slightly modified to appease the 
council." France Planning to Jail Illegal Immigrants, NY. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A3. 
339 STONE, supra note 18, at 120. 
340Id. 
341Id. 
342Id. 
343Id. at 129. 
344Vroom, supra note 6, at 276. 
345 See STONE, supra note 18, at 216. 
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Although it is true that politicians and lawmakers must consider 
the possibility that their policies will come under the scrutiny of the 
Conseil, this does not mean that the Conseil itself engages in direct 
policy-making. It would be wrong, however, to say that the Conseil 
is detached from the political process. It is appointed by politicians 
and convened only by politicians, most often by the opposition.346 
Its jurisprudence only binds politicians because the Conseil rules on 
the constitutionality of legislation after it has been adopted by Par-
liament but before it may be promulgated.347 Yet the Conseil should 
not be characterized as a partisan body serving a particular political 
interest.348 It is more appropriately characterized as a nonpartisan 
body serving a national political tradition.349 Since only controversial 
legislation leads to referral, the Conseil's decisions inevitably deal 
with political issues. The more important question is whether the 
Conseil itself is politically motivated. Despite the Conseil members' 
diverse career backgrounds and past political affiliations, the Immi-
gration and Asylum decision was, like most Conseil decisions, unan-
imous.35o 
Regardless of the inherently political nature of matters before the 
Conseil, it has managed to establish and develop constitutional 
jurisprudence that is recognized in French law today, especially in 
the area of individual rights.351 The Conseil has achieved this task by 
acting as a constitutional court, rather than as a strict policy-making 
body. It should be noted, however, that the Conseil necessarily en-
forces policy when it modifies laws according to reserves d'interpreta-
tion. The importance of modification is that it brings a proposed law 
(and the policies behind it) in line with constitutional principles. It 
is difficult, however, to ensure the legitimacy of decisions that are 
justified by interpretations of constitutional texts not settled in legal 
doctrine.352 
Since 1971,353 the Conseil has attempted to create a constitutional 
jurisprudence and to establish constitutional principles in order to 
develop legal doctrine. The Conseil has established constitutional 
346Id. at 4, 220. 
347Id. at 220. 
348BELL, supra note 5, at 237. 
349Id. 
350 See BELL, supra note 5, at 47. 
351 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 334. 
352 Stone notes that American constitutional law can be more easily defended due to the 
longevity of the constitutional regime and the historical tradition of judge-made law. STONE, 
supra note IS, at 11. The Conseil is only a recent institution with no historical tradition to 
fall back upon. 
353 Decision of July 16,1971, Con. const., 1971].0. 7114. The Conseil used the phrase: "In 
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jurisprudence by taking a legalistic approach to decision-making.354 
It relies on the legally binding texts which comprise the bloc de 
constitutionalite, as well as the principles derived from those texts as 
the sole authority on constitutional law, and applies them to the 
challenged legislation.355 These constitutional considerations are 
often stumbling blocks for the government in getting its policies 
passed in the form of legislation.356 Therefore, the result of a deci-
sion may be that some policy cannot be implemented. But the basis 
for that decision lies in legal reasoning, rather than in political 
argument and motive.357 This result is exactly what occurred in the 
Immigration and Asylum decision. The Conseil employed legal rea-
soning to formulate its conclusion that the means proposed for 
achieving the goals of the Pasqua Bill infringed on individual rights 
and principles of equality, and therefore could not be implemented. 
Despite the legalistic approach it has taken, the Conseil has been 
criticized as being a gouvernement des juges358 that is usurping the 
executive and legislative branches of their roles in government be-
cause it makes significant political decisions.359 The primary purpose 
for the creation of the Conseil was to maintain a balance between 
the executive and legislative branches of government, and it appears 
to be fulfilling that purpose by acting as a check on the legislature 
and the Government.360 But, in light of the broad discretion it gives 
to these branches in their law making, the Conseil does not appear 
to be usurping any of their power. It assures that the legislature's 
power does not exceed constitutional limits. 
Although the Conseil has succeeded in having the legislature 
respect constitutional principles of individual rights and freedoms 
in the laws it passes, it has repeatedly maintained that it does not 
possess a general power of discretion and decision identical to that 
ofParliament.36! Politics is still politics, and has not been overrun by 
light of the Constitution, and especially of its Preamble," giving the incorporated texts legally 
binding force. [d. 
354BELL, supra note 5, at 229. 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 129-32. The Conseil was forced to develop these 
principles because they were derived from various fragments of the different constitutional 
texts and needed to be pieced together. See BELL, supra note 5. at 57. 
356 [d. at 234. 
357 See id. at 229. The Conseil's decisions transform political arguments into legal ones. [d. 
358 [d. at 227. The phrase means a government of judges, signifying that the Conseil is more 
political than judicial. See id. 
359BELL, supra note 5, at 227. 
360 See infra text accompanying notes 379-81. 
361 Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., 1981 ].0.309; see also Vroom, supra note 6, at 
315-16. 
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constitutional review. For example, only eight of the Pasqua Bill's 
fifty-one Articles were struck down in the Immigration and Asylum 
decision.362 The decision also offers an example of the large degree 
of discretion the Conseil gives to Parliament in its authority to 
regulate the exercise of individualliberties.363 
At the beginning of its decision, the Conseil explicitly stated that 
the legislature (or Government as lawmaker) was free to implement 
general policies of immigration and asylum law, treating foreigners 
differently than French nationals, so long as those policies respected 
the liberties and rights set out in the Constitution.364 Legislation that 
mandates different treatment of persons in situations distinct from 
those of French nationals does not violate the principle of equality 
unless it is completely arbitrary.365 Additionally, use of reserves d'in-
terpretation allows otherwise unconstitutional legislation to be 
deemed constitutional by the Conseip66 The Immigration and Asy-
lum decision makes it clear that even very questionable legislation 
can pass constitutional muster. The Conseil declared constitutional 
the proposed law on random police identity checks even absent a 
threat to public order (the previous standard). 367 It conditioned the 
constitutionality of the law upon the implementation of proper 
procedural safeguards by the judicial authorities under a reserve 
d 'interpretation. 368 Reform is difficult to achieve only when the Con-
seil finds that application of the proposed legislation violates a 
fundamental right.369 For example, in the Immigration and Asylum 
decision, the Conseil struck down the proposed legislation increas-
ing periods of administrative and judicial detention because it de-
prived the detainee of his or her fundamental right to liberty.37o A 
possible justification for the Conseil's deference to the police in the 
area of identity checks is that identity is easily verifiable, and not 
overly intrusive to the individuaP71 Detention, on the other hand, 
362 Brehier, supra note 67, at 7. 
363 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 316. 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 145-47. 
365 BELL, supra note 5, at 223--24. 
366STONE, supra note 18, at 88-89. 
367 See Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. const., 1993 ].0. 11723. 
368 See id. 
369 BELL, supra note 5, at 235-36. 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 210-12. 
371 Vroom, supra note 6, at 287. Critics of anti-immigration policies argue that the identity 
checks are highly intrusive and are aimed primarily at Arab and black immigrants. Webster, 
supra note 65. 
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involves a greater infringement upon an individual's right to privacy 
and freedom of movement.372 
It seems that the only obligation the Conseil imposes upon Par-
liament is to respect constitutional principles when it makes laws.373 
Unfortunately, however, the Parliamentary majority may not fulfill 
this obligation and instead, may approve laws that infringe upon 
individual constitutional rights. It is in this situation that the referral 
system becomes instrumental, because it provides the only means 
for a political minority to challenge the constitutionality of laws 
proposed by the political majority. Although constitutional review is 
a strategic tool for the political opposition, it is also an effective 
guarantee that rights and liberties will be important elements of 
legislative debate.374 By basing its decisions on the notions of equal-
ity, individual liberty, and the fundamental right to asylum, the 
Conseil ensures its own stability and legitimacy as the guardian of 
the Constitution and the principles it invokes. 
The Government also questions the legitimacy of the Conseil 
when implementations of its policies are blocked by a Conseil deci-
sion. Although the Government policies may seek to further valid 
goals, the means to achieving these aims may infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of individuals. 375 Oftentimes, the pressures of 
society and law enforcement become strong enough to incite Gov-
ernment action which directly limits individual liberties. 376 Under 
such circumstances, it has become the role of the Conseil to step in 
and balance the Government's need for order against the need to 
protect individual rights. 377 
The Conseil was faced with such a situation in its Immigration and 
Asylum decision because the Government-proposed Pasqua Bill was 
approved by a majority in Parliament and received widespread sup-
port from public opinion. If the Conseil had blindly agreed to the 
restrictions on immigration and asylum introduced by the Pasqua 
Bill, it would have had difficulty because it would still have had to 
provide the appropriate reasoning for its decision. On the other 
hand, by questioning the validity of particular provisions of the law 
and declaring some of them unconstitutional, the Conseil invited 
372 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 280. 
373 See BELL, supra note 5, at 236 (citing one decision). 
374 STONE, supra note 18, at 220. 
375 See BELL, supra note 5, at 238. 
376Vroom, supra note 6, at 32l. 
377 See id. 
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strong opposition from members of the government and from the 
public. As one commentator notes: "[l]aws are referred to the Con-
seil by political factions opposed to the text, and the Conseil hands 
down its decision while the debate is still current; as a result, deci-
sions risk being unfairly politicized despite their careful legal rea-
soning. "378 
It is crucial to remember that the purpose of the Constitution is 
to set out the methods and principles by which the government is 
to conduct itself.379 These guiding principles constitute the values of 
the society that accepts the Constitution as a supralegislative text. It 
follows that the legislature, as the governmental representative of 
the people, may conduct itself according to the will of the people, 
but "[t]he law expresses the general will only when it respects the 
Constitution. "380 When the legislature (or the executive branch 
when making laws) exceeds its authority under the Constitution, it 
is violating those principles which it has a duty to uphold. The 
Conseil, then, acts as a safeguard against such violations, reminding 
the branches of government that ultimately there is a legal sanction 
for failure to comply with the Constitution.38! 
B. Recognition of the Conseil's Constitutional jurisprudence 
This constitutional jurisprudence, especially in the area of indi-
vidual rights, is recognized today not only by the Government and 
the legislature, but also by the highest French courts. In part, this 
recognition is due to the growing familiarity with constitutional 
principles that results from a greater number ofConseil decisions. 382 
In the first ten years after the 1974 amendment modifYing the 
referral system383 the number of referrals increased from one to 
thirteen each year, and more than half of the referrals related to the 
protection of individual rights.384 This significant increase in deci-
sions, especially in the area of individual rights and liberties, dem-
onstrates the importance of constitutional review of the legislative 
process. Awareness of the Conseil Constitutionnel's jurisprudence 
and the desire to minimize the chance of its censure are also indi-
cated by the legislature's (or the Government's) use of the Conseil 
378Yroom, supra note 6, at 330. 
379 See BELL, supra note 5, at 2. 
380 Decision of Aug. 23, 1985, quoted in Yroom, supra note 6, at 305. 
381 See BELL, supra note 5, at 234. 
382Yroom, supra note 6, at 309-10. 
383 See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
384Yroom, supra note 6, at 276. 
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d'Etat's advisory opinions under Article 39 of the Constitution.385 
Under this scheme, the Conseil d'Etat formulates an opinion on a 
bill's constitutionality in light of the jurisprudence of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel. 386 
The Conseil d'Etat's recognition of the Conseil Constitutionnel's 
jurisprudence is not limited to the formulation of advisory opinions. 
It has explicitly followed the Conseil's interpretations relating to 
individual liberties.387 The Conseil's interpretations of the protection 
of liberty have also been cited at the Cour de Cassation, France's 
highest ordinary court.388 It is important to note that neither of these 
courts were bound to follow the jurisprudence of the Conseil, but 
did so voluntarily. 
The Conseil has become instrumental as a protector of individual 
rights and freedoms. Yet although it has succeeded in establishing 
constitutional jurisprudence in French law, it is severely limited in 
the application of that jurisprudence. Not only do the Government 
and legislature have the option of referring proposed laws to the 
Conseil for review, but they also have the opportunity to revise laws 
judged unconstitutional to achieve conformity with the Conseil's 
decision. 389 
In the case of the Immigration and Asylum decision, Interior Min-
ister Pasqua took advantage of this opportunity and revised the 
annulled laws enough for them to pass constitutional muster. For 
example, the new judicial detention law still permits a three-month 
detention period, arguably an infringement of individualliberty.39o 
But the revised law, in accordance with the Conseil's reserve d'inter-
pretation, justifies this intrusion upon individual liberty by imposing 
such safeguards as a minimum age for the detainee and the avail-
ability of medical and legal assistance.391 It is unfortunate that poli-
ticians and legislators in France may draft legislation with language 
that does not overtly violate the Constitution but has the effect of 
385FR. CONST. art. 39; see also Vroom, supra note 6, at 317-18. 
386 See Vroom, supra note 6, at 317-18. 
387Id. at 313-14. 
388Id. at 310-11. It should be noted that the Cour de Cassation's deference to the Conseil's 
interpretation of constitutional sources is a recent development. See BELL, supra note 5, at 
49-50. Two years after the Conseil's Vehicle Searches decision (striking down law conferring 
on police unlimited power to search vehicles on highway where there was no crime or threat 
to public order), the Cour de Cassation issued a decision undermining the effect of the earlier 
Conseil decision. Id. (holding that the police could search vehicles belonging to any person 
under the general provisions relating to the investigation of "flagran t offenses"). 
389 See e.g.,].C.P. No. 41, Oct. 13, 1993 (Actualites sec.). 
390 See id. 
391 !d. 
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weakening constitutional rights when it is applied. This problem is 
especially dangerous in immigration and asylum legislation, which 
builds on an inherently discriminatory basis and involves notions of 
equality and due process. 
C. Consequences of the Constitutional Amendment 
Another stumbling block for the Conseil in its role as protector 
of rights and liberties is the ability of the Government or the legis-
lature to override a Conseil decision by changing the Constitution 
to make it conform to new legislation. The recent adoption of the 
amendment modifying France's historically liberal asylum policy 
illustrates exactly the reality of this danger. The Conseil's efforts to 
put a check on the government by opposing legislation infringing 
upon the rights of asylum-seekers failed. The government's desire 
to comply with the Schengen Agreement simply trumped the con-
stitutionally-mandated asylum policy set out in the Preamble to the 
1946 Constitution.392 While it is clear that the goals of the Schengen 
Agreement could not be achieved without France's cooperation 
regarding asylum policy, the measures taken for harmonization must 
not ignore fundamental constitutional rights. Ironically, implemen-
tation of Schengen has been delayed indefinitely,393 casting doubt 
on the necessity of the constitutional amendment and the resulting 
compromise of France's tradition asylum policy. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the Conseil Constitutionnel has made 
considerable progress in establishing itself as a legitimate authority 
392 See supra text accompanying notes 322-25. The necessity of this amendment is question-
able. One commentator asserts that article 29(4) provides France with a way to retain the 
language of the Preamble and still comply with the Schengen Agreement. See )Yes Gautier, 
CHRONIQUE, Dec. 1993 (on file with the B.C. INT'L & CaMP. L. REv.). It is questionable 
whether asylum is as serious a problem as the government is portraying it to be. Kerry, supra 
note 76. 
393 Philippe Bernard, Au nom de Schengen, L'ajoumement de la mise en oeuvre de la convention 
rend inoperantes plusieurs lois contre ['immigration clandestine [In the name of Schengen, Post-
ponement of the convention's implementation makes several anti-immigration laws ineffective], LE 
MONDE, Feb. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Monde File. The newest deadline, 
predicted as October of 1994, is almost two years after the original deadline. Denmark Applies 
for Observer Status with Schengen Group, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., MAY 27, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The uncertainty surrounding France's com-
mitment to Schengen is in large part due to Pasqua's hard-line stance on immigration, and 
is viewed as an obstacle to implementation of the agreement. !d. 
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on constitutional jurisprudence and as a protector of individual 
rights and freedoms. There is certainly a need for even greater 
constitutional control in the areas of immigration and asylum, where 
rights and freedoms are on shaky ground. The 1974 constitutional 
amendment expanding the referral system has significantly in-
creased the number of constitutional challenges brought before the 
Conseil. The Conseil, however, is still confined to reviewing legisla-
tion that has not been promulgated. Perhaps the government 
should reconsider the proposal to allow ordinary courts the option 
of referring promulgated laws to the Conseil. This would provide 
the legal system with a mechanism for individual access to judicial 
review of laws. Furthermore, it would create a formal link to the 
judiciary system and to individual litigants, both diminishing skep-
ticism of the Conseil's nonpolitical nature and strengthening the 
Conseil's status as the protector of rights and liberties. 
Susan Soltesz 
